



Legal scholarship in recent years has emphasized the law's indirect ef-
fects on our modes of expression, our perceptions of ourselves, and our
relationships with others.' This scholarship understands law not only as a
style of problem-solving leading to rules that define minimally acceptable
behavior,2 but also as a system that produces and reproduces the disposi-
tions and values of its citizens.' That law influences the character as well
as the behavior of its citizens seems intuitively obvious.4 Turning that in-
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1. See, e.g., G. GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOL-
OGY 173 (1983) (law as "distinctive manner of imagining the real"); M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND
DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 8 (1987) (law "tells stories about the culture that helped to shape it and
which it in turn helps to shape"); Fuller, Some Presuppositions Shaping the Concept of "Socializa-
tion," in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 33,
37 (J. Tapp & F. Levine eds. 1977) (law stimulates process "whereby a person comes to perceive,
respect, and participate in the creation of the reciprocal expectations that arise out of human interac-
tion"); White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 684, 684 (1985) (law is rhetoric and "central art by which community and culture are
established, maintained, and transformed").
An important segment of this scholarship has stressed how metaphors expressed in the law limit
people's imaginations about what is possible. See M. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, META-
PHOR AND THEOLOGY 17, 22, 28, 32-33 (1985); see also Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the
Problem of Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988) (metaphor of standing has influenced how
legal doctrine has developed). For a coherent, documented presentation of the role of metaphor in
influencing our perceptions, see G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE By (1980).
2. The traditional view that law exists to define minimally acceptable behavior is captured best,
perhaps, by Holmes' "bad man" theory of the law: "If you want to know the law and nothing else,
you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge
enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or
outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience." O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COL-
LECTED LEGAL PAPERS 171 (1920).
3. The study of how the legal system produces and reproduces itself has been labelled autopoiesis.
For a collection of essays on law as an autopoietic system, see AuToPoiric LAW: A NEW AP-
PROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY (G. Teubner ed. 1988).
4. However intuitive it may now seem, this view challenges the traditional dichotomy between
legal and moral constraints that underlies our more established conceptions of law. See, e.g., H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 165-69 (1961); O.W. HOLMES, supra note 2, at 169-79. Even those
contemporary scholars advocating a greater emphasis on the public cultivation of virtue typically con-
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sight into constructive recommendations for legal reform, however, is a
highly problematic enterprise.'
In this article, I argue that the law currently applied to one particular
set of child custody disputes expresses a view of parenthood which is
undesirable. This view is grounded in notions of exchange and individual
rights, and implicity encourages parental possessiveness and self-
centeredness. 6 I suggest how we might proceed to reshape the law to ex-
press a better view of parenthood. This alternative view is based upon
notions of benevolence and responsibility, and is intended to reinforce pa-
rental dispositions toward generosity and other-directedness. I focus on
custody disputes in which one biological parent seeks to deny parental
status to the other. These include claims by unmarried women seeking
"nonmarital motherhood-by-choice,"' claims by single women seeking to
place their newborn children for adoption over the objection of the biologi-
cal father, and claims by "surrogate" mothers who, after agreeing to bear
a child for another, change their minds and seek to retain custody. These
cases, which raise fundamental questions about the meaning of
parenthood, provide a rich landscape for examining the law's expressive
functions. I will be concerned less with the results of any particular
law-who wins a dispute-than with the structure and expressive mean-
tinue to see the role of law as confined to charting appropriate behavior, with little or no relevance to
defining or producing virtue or character. See, e.g., E. PINCOFFS, QUANDARIES AND VIRTUES:
AGAINST REDucrivisM IN ETmics 9-10, 18-32 (1986) (law is modelled on quandary ethics rather
than virtue ethics).
5. An example of recent legal scholarship that takes account of the expressive effects of law is M.
GLENDON, supra note 1. Professor Glendon offers numerous recommendations for the reform of laws
relating to abortion and divorce in this country based upon her analysis that the "stories" our present
laws tell are not as desirable to us as the "stories" told by the laws she proposes (most of which are
drawn from her study of Western European law). While I have criticized Glendon both for the
content of the reforms she proposes and for her failure to acknowledge the subjectivity of her enter-
prise, see Bartlett, Storytelling, 1987 DUKE L.J. 760 (1987), her pioneer work represents the con-
structive potential of this new type of legal scholarship.
Martha Fineman, in her analysis of legal change in child custody decision-making, also has given a
great deal of attention to how the language of the law carries us in certain "reform" directions.
Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Deci-
sionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727 (1988). While Fineman and I disagree about what rheto-
ric-and what substantive results-are most desirable in child custody law, compare id. at 760-61,
768-74 (arguing for primary parent rule in child custody cases and stressing notions of fairness to
mothers), with Bartlett & Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the Dependency Dilemma, 2 BERKE-
LEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1986) (favoring joint custody because it promotes ideology of shared responsi-
bility for children by mothers and fathers), we agree about the importance of rhetoric in influencing
substantive results.
6. Carl Schneider describes individual rights as "self-concerning." Schneider, Rights Discourse
and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 151, 162-64 (1988); see also Sherry, An Essay Con-
cerning Toleration, 71 MINN. L. REv. 963, 964 (1987) (rights theory "encourages selfishness rather
than altruism or community-mindedness"). This theme also runs through much of the critical legal
studies critique of rights. See, e.g., Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness, 62 TEX. L.
REv, 1563, 1577 (1984); Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TERx. L. REv. 1417, 1418 (1984).
7. A woman who opts for "nonmarital motherhood-by-choice" purposefully becomes pregnant
with the intention of raising the child without interference from or further involvement by the child's
genetic father. See Donovan, The Uniform Parentage Act and Nonmarital Motherhood-by-Choice, 11
N.Y.U. REv. L. & SoC. CHANGE 193, 193 n.1 (1982-1983).
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ings of the law-especially the kind of arguments the law urges the par-
ticipants to make, and the construction of the parent-child relationship
(and the concept of "the good parent") those arguments foster.
I propose that we attempt to re-direct the law applicable to disputes
over parental status toward a view of parenthood based on responsibility
and connection. The law should force parents to state their claims, and
courts to evaluate such claims, not from the competing, individuated per-
spectives of either parent or even of the child, but from the perspective of
each parent-child relationship. And in evaluating (and thereby giving
meaning to) that relationship, the law should focus on parental responsi-
bility rather than reciprocal "rights," and express a view of parenthood
based upon the cycle of gift rather than the cycle of exchange.8
Although this article joins the contemporary, seemingly endless debate
about rights,' it is not a broad attack on rights. Perspectives aided by
"rights talk" enhance the desired meanings of certain kinds of legal dis-
putes. Patricia Williams has eloquently explained how civil rights doc-
trines have given voice to wrongs that otherwise seemed beyond reach, and
justified results that otherwise seemed unwarranted.' ° Rights talk is not
always, however, the most appropriate voice. Legal disputes over
parenthood are an example of how the presentation of claims in terms of
8. I emphasize similar values in defending joint custody options in child custody cases at divorce
in Bartlett & Stack, supra note 5, at 8; see also M. BALL, supra note 1, at 13 (contrasting market
cycle of exchange and consumption with gift cycle of increase and relationship); Finley, Transcending
Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118,
1171-72 (1986) (urging ideal of responsibility in debate about pregnancy).
9. Family law scholars have criticized existing rights doctrines from many angles. Some critics
find these doctrines morally defective or destructive of the family. See, e.g., M. GLENDON, supra note
1; P. RIGA, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LAW: HISTORICAL, CONSTrrTIONAL, AND PRACTICAL PER-
SPECTIVES 135-41 (1986); Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Pri-
vacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983); Schneider,
Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985)
[hereinafter Schneider, Moral Discourse]. Other scholars find the premises of rights arguments false,
in that they assume individuals who are atomistic and self-contained rather than connected and inter-
dependent. See Finley, supra note 8, at 1159-61; Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That
Grows": Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 820, 893 [hereinafter Minow, "Form-
ing Underneath Everything That Grows"]; Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Ap-
proach to Children's Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 14-21 (1986). Still others criticize the false
pretense of objectivity and determinacy of rights, see Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of
Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REv. 387, 391, 412 (1984), and the tendency of rights discourse to
alienate people and mislead them into accepting socially constructed phenomena as inevitable. Schnei-
der, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics. Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 589, 595 (1986) [hereinafter Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics].
A few family law scholars, sensitive to both the constructive potential of rights and the validity of
the criticisms against them, have suggested possibilities for radically redefining the meaning of rights.
Martha Minow, for example, urges that we view rights as tools for establishing connections and
relationships as well as individual prerogatives, and that we move from an understanding of rights as
fixed and determinate principles, to redefine rights as perpetuating, "evolving and adaptive" tools for
expressing human aspirations. Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE
L.J. 1860, 1876, 1888, 1891-93 (1987) [hereinafter Minow, Interpreting Rights]; see also infra text
accompanying note 23. I am pursuing the same goal as Minow, but from a different angle.
10. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987).
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individual rights may force controversies into a framework that misstates
the harm to be avoided and undermines the values we should promote. I
demonstrate this point in a set of cases where single parents unilaterally
seek exclusive responsibility for children, although I believe it might be
more generally made with respect to other kinds of family law disputes. I
hope this article will encourage an invigorating reevaluation of how we
use rights doctrines throughout family law and, where appropriate, a re-
expression of the values of relationship which existing rights doctrines
now misrepresent.
In defending a re-expression of parenthood to give greater emphasis to
responsibility and less to rights, I do not mean to suggest a stark dichot-
omy between the two. Both express significant, in some respects comple-
mentary, dimensions of ourselves and our understandings of parenthood.
In the case of rights, the law engages us in an active, empowering, and
self-affirming way; in the case of responsibility, the law motivates our
ethical sensibilities, our motivation to "do right."" I do not reject either
dimension. Rather, I argue that the rights dimension expressed in our law
of parenthood is out of proportion to the responsibility dimension, and
that (continual) readjustments are needed.
Likewise, I do not claim that responsibility and connection are the only
values worth promoting through our rules about parenthood and child
custody. I start with these values because they are compelling and because
they are submerged within the exchange view of parenthood that now
dominates our discourse. Other values-avoidance of prolonged custody
conflicts,"2 predictability of results,'" economic and physical security
within families,' 4 the de-subordination of women,'" and even fairness to
11. See L. PETRAZYCIi, LAW AND MORALITY 121 (H. Babb trans. 1955, orig. work pub.
1904-1910) ("Law, in conformity with its imperative-attributive nature, is characterized by bilateral
motivational action: side by side with passive ethical motivation (the consciousness of a duty) there is
active ethical motivation (the consciousness of being empowered and endowed), and the result is indi-
vidual and mass conduct correspondingly coordinated.").
Rights and responsibility do not form a neat dichotomy also in the sense that claims based upon
responsibility are easily restated in terms of rights. See infra text accompanying notes 197-198.
12. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
31-49 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS].
13. See Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy,
39 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoas. 226, 262-68 (Summer 1975); Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 969-71, 975, 977-80 (1979).
14. See M. EDELMAN, FAMILIES IN PERIL: AN AGENDA FOR SOCIAL CHANGE (1987); K. KENIS-
TON, ALL OUR CHILDREN: THE AMERICAN FAMILY UNDER PRESSURE (1977); see also Wald, State
Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their
Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28
STAN. L. REV. 623, 646 n.112 (1976) (arguing in favor of shifting funds now spent on foster care to
meeting physical needs of children).
15. The problem of the de-subordination of women is of special interest to me. Later, I suggest
how the value of responsibility within the parent-child relationship relates to this and other feminist
goals. See infra text accompanying notes 200-01.
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parents"e-should also be debated and analyzed in terms of their relative
importance and how the law's rhetoric might promote them.
The discussion I propose involves fundamental questions about who we
are as a society and what it means to be part of our community. For many
of us, this debate implicates contrary impulses-a longing for community
and a desire for freedom from that community. We want a society in
which parents share the highest norms of what the parent-child relation-
ship should be, but we also want parents to be free to raise their children
in their own way. Struggles over balancing these goals are political strug-
gles, which have outcomes that are historically contingent and temporary.
That there are no universally "correct" answers, however, does not mean
that we should not approach these questions as if there are "better" and
"worse" answers for us, at this time. We can, from the position of our
particular, constantly moving contexts, construct improved meanings for
our relationships with one another.1" This article represents one effort to
do so.
II. RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE THEORY OF PARENTHOOD
A. Parenthood as Exchange
Since the earliest days of the modern liberal state, parenthood has been
expressed in terms of exchange: Parents have rights with respect to their
children in exchange for the performance of their parental responsibilities.
Sir William Blackstone, John Locke, and Samuel Pufendorf, for example,
all state that the rights or powers of parents arise from their duties in
caring for their offspring."8 As Locke writes, "the Power. . . that Par-
ents have over their Children, arises from that Duty which is incumbent
upon them, to take care of their Off-spring, during the imperfect state of
Childhood."'"
16. The view that parents' rights should be the focus of child custody law is represented most
recently in Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REv.
1, 16-21 (1987); see also Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Di-
vorce, 83 MICH. L. REv. 477, 499-503 (1984) (reviewing reasons why society might wish to prefer
parents' interests).
17. This view is similar to the concept of "positionality" set forth by Linda Alcoff in addressing
the essentialist/post-structuralist epistemological impasse of feminist theory. Alcoff, Cultural Femi-
nism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory, 13 SIGNs 405, 434 (1988)
(arguing that "[tihe position of women is relative and not innate, and yet neither is it
'undecidable.' 
").
18. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452; J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERN-
MENT 348-49 (2d Treatise § 58) (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1960) (3d ed. 1698); S. PUFENDORF, OF THE
LAw OF NATURE AND NATIONS 112 (Oxford trans.) (1703).
19. J. LOCKE, supra note 18; see also id. at 329 (2d Treatise § 66) ("God having made the
Parents Instruments in his great design of continuing the Race of Mankind, and the occasions of Life
to their Children, as he hath laid on them an obligation to nourish, preserve, and bring up their Off-
spring."); id. at 328 (Second Treatise § 65) ("Nay, this power so little belongs to the Father by any
peculiar right of Nature, but only as he is Guardian of his Children, that when he quits his Care of
them, he loses his power over them . . . to which it is inseparably annexed. ... ).
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The exchange view of parenthood is based upon the reciprocity of pa-
rental rights and duties. "° Parents have rights that create obligations and
obligations that create rights. Within this circular, self-reinforcing cycle of
exchange, rights are emphasized, strengthened by their justification in ob-
ligation. Indeed, the reciprocal connection to obligation seems to make
rights themselves morally compelled. As a consequence, parents asserting
rights to children may construe their obligations not as independent duties
or expectations, but as the moral underpinning of their rights. "Having
rights" means to be entitled to, to be owed, to have earned, or to deserve
something in exchange for who one is or what one has done.
As is the case with other individual rights clalms, parents asserting
rights to children tend to emphasize what is due to them rather than what
they owe to others. As Carl Schneider has observed, "thinking in terms of
rights . . . encourages us to think about what constrains us from doing
what we want, not what obligates us to do what we ought.' 12  The rights
generated within this view stress entitlement over responsibility, autonomy
over connectedness, self over others. 2 Rights claims tend to exalt the
"my" over the "ours," the "I" over the "we."
It may be possible, as Martha Minow argues, to alter our understand-
ings of rights so that they express community and interconnection, in ad-
dition or in preference to individualism and separateness." Thus, we
might redefine parental rights to stress the parent's relationship interests,
rather than the parent's autonomy. Even then, the focus is on what be-
longs to the parent rather than how the parent belongs to others. In any
event, whether we revolutionize what we mean by parental rights or move
beyond them, we need to take a fresh, concentrated look at the alternative
meanings of parenthood that are available to us.
B. Parenthood as Responsibility Within Relationship
Responsibility and relationship are difficult terms to pin down. They
are evolving rather than fixed concepts, constituted by the attitudes and
responses of those engaged, through practice, in living out their mean-
ings.24 These attitudes and responses, of which law is a part, form a con-
20. See Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 652 (1881) ("because of this obligation to take care of
and support this helpless being arises a reciprocal right to the custody and care of the offspring whom
he must support ... ").
21. Schneider, supra note 6, at 37; see also Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 9, at 1858
("the rights approach must be ... hostile to moral discourse, because the resolution of moral
problems must commonly be particularistic and delicate, while the promulgation and enforcement of
rights is often generalistic and insensitive to nuance").
22. See supra note 6.
23. In articulating this more fluid understanding of rights doctrine, Professor Minow stresses the
importance to rights-bearing individuals of "social networks" and "roles connecting with others." Mi-
now, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows," supra note 9, at 894; see also Schneider, The
Dialectic of Rights and Politics, supra note 9, at 617-22.
24. See Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme, in
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tinuous, ongoing process. In this section, I outline some of the important
dimensions of a concept of responsibility that might be expressed through
the law's handling of parenthood disputes.
1. Responsibility, Relationship, and Identification
Although some notions of social responsibility have associated duty or
obligation with individual autonomy,25 responsibility-as I use the term
here-is grounded in relationship rather than autonomy. Responsibility
describes a certain type of connection that persons may experience in their
relationships with one another. That connection is one of identification.
Identification requires a "[riecognition of the other person's reality, and
the possibility of putting yourself in his place . ,, Identification must
be positive and affirming; it seeks what is good for the other person.
The experience and meaning of responsibility may be quite personal
and individualized. Its meaning, however, is derived within a social con-
text that defines ideal roles for persons engaged in particular relation-
ships.28 Thus, while individuals to a certain extent choose the terms of
their own relationships, the choices they make and the meaning given to
those choices are strongly shaped by role expectations defined by the com-
munity. At the same time, responsibility means more than fulfilling some
precise set of pre-defined role requirements. A responsible person cares
not only about doing "her part" (or "his part") in a limited sense, but
also about outcome, and is disposed toward expanding or perhaps redefin-
ing the demands of role as necessary to accomplish that outcome. Respon-
sibility, in other words, is a self-enlarging, open-ended commitment on
behalf of another.
Parenthood illustrates well the wide spectrum of commitments one may
make in fulfilling one's role responsibility. As a parent, one may do what
one thinks is expected of a person in that role, applying one's best in-
stincts and perhaps even book-learning to guide the child from infancy
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 256 (F. Schoeman ed. 1987).
25. See Gilligan, Remapping the Moral Domain: New Images of the Self in Relationship, in
RECONSTRUCTING INDIVIDUALISM: AUTONOMY, INDIVIDUALITY, AND THE SELF IN WESTERN
THOUGHT 237 (T. Heller, N. Sosna, & D. Wellbery eds. 1986) (using Aeneid to illustrate "long
history" in western tradition of connection between social responsibility and "the representation of the
self as separate and bounded").
26. This language is from Thomas Nagel's description of altruism. T. NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY
OF ALTRUISM 83 (1970); see also N. NODDINGS, CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND
MORAL EDUCATION 14 (1984) ("When I look at and think about how I am when I care, I realize
that there is invariably this displacement of interest from my own reality to the reality of the other.").
27. James Wallace describes this quality as benevolence: "A benevolent person is not concerned
merely about avoiding certain forms of behavior that he regards as wrong: he is directly concerned for
the good of other people." J. WALLACE, VIRTUES AND VICES 130 (1978).
28. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 212-13 (1968) (describing "role-
responsibility"); Hamilton, Who Is Responsible? Toward a Social Psychology of Responsibility Attri-
bution, 41 SoC. PSYCHOLOGY 316 (1978) (role expectations form context for exercise of responsibil-
ity, rather than acting as external constraint).
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into a mature and productive adulthood. But a parent who refrains from a
personal commitment to how the child "turns out"2 has not assumed full
responsibility for that relationship. The responsible, child-identified par-
ent is inclined to intepret the role of parent broadly and flexibly, and is
satisfied only when the child has "turned out" well.
2. Responsibility, Freedom, and Obligation
The identification that responsibility entails develops within a context
in which both coercion and freedom are essential. Responsibility connotes
obligation. Obligation, of course, may be cheerfully, as well as reluctantly,
assumed. But even voluntary acts can be judged according to some norma-
tive (whether objective or subjective) standard, and to the extent that this
standard directs a person's conduct, we might say that that conduct has
been coerced.
Responsibility also, however, connotes freedom. Indeed, at the core of
the notion of responsibility is the exercise of discretion:30 Authentic re-
sponsibility can develop only where a person is free to act virtuously or
not.31 "To act virtuously is not . . . to act against inclination; it is to act
from inclination formed by the cultivation of the virtues.13 2
The conflicting notions of freedom and compulsion that are embedded
in the concept of responsibility encapsulate the dialectic tension that phi-
losophers and commentators have found to be bound up in our basic no-
tions of selfhood.13 Nel Noddings, in her work on an ethic of caring, deals
with this tension specifically in the context of close, personal relationships.
Noddings finds a basis for free action in our longing for caring and rela-
tionship, which motivates us to do what we ought to do to maintain caring
29. What it means to "turn out" well, of course, depends upon one's values and the values of
one's social group. See Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, in MOTHERING 213, 220 (J. Trebilcot ed.
1984). The point here is that whatever social norms about growing up to be an "acceptable" adult
exist, a parent who has truly taken responsibility for a child cares deeply about that child's ultimate
development. (S)he will not be satisfied merely to have discharged her/his duty in the eyes of others.
30. See Pennock, The Problem of Responsibility, in RESPONSIBILITY (NoMos III) 3, 4 (C. Fried-
rich ed. 1960).
31. Freund, Responsibility-Definitions, Distinctions, and Applications in Various Contexts in
RESPONSIBILITY (NoMos III), supra note 30, at 28, 37. I refer here not so much to the absence of
culpability for acts done by a person in some way coerced, but also to the absence of moral credit due
to a person who acts under compulsion. Both of these dimensions are discussed in Fischer, Introduc-
tion: Responsibility and Freedom, in MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 9, 9-14 UJ. Fischer ed. 1986).
32. A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 140 (1981); see also Seneca, On Benefits (Epistle), It. 20-24
in 2 SENECA, EPISTULAE MORALES 218, 231-32 (R. Grummere trans. 1970) ("honourable benefac-
tor" acts not "because it profits me, but because it pleases me").
33. See S. FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC AND THE PRACTICE
OF THEORY IN LEGAL AND LITERARY STUDIES (1989) (forthcoming) (comparing Milton's concept of
"willing followers" with Unger's concept of freedom acquired through being bound to one's commu-
nity); M. TAYLOR, JOURNEYS TO SELFHOOD: HEGEL & KIEEGAARD 174-76, 243-47 (1980) (ana-
lyzing ways in which Kierkegaard and Hegel resolved tension within self between freedom and neces-
sity); Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models
of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 150 & n.28 (1977-1978) (analyzing how Kant
and Rousseau linked freedom of self with goals and values emanating from community).
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relationships."' Her vision is an "I must" constrained by "our best picture
of ourselves."'3 5 Within the context of the parent-child relationship, Nod-
dings' concept of caring suggests that parents are free to (and should) bind
themselves to act according to their most ennobled sense of what
parenthood requires. This binding occurs within a social milieu which
creates and sustains the ideals that parents internalize as part of their
"ennobled selves."
In this sense, responsibility is a form of self-expression." Responsible
action is chosen, but that choice expresses a particular set of internalized
limits and constraints that define the person. This expression provides to
the individual a sense of his or her own particularity that is essential to
the subjective freedom required for moral decision-making.37 The moral
growth that comes from being held accountable for one's actions, in turn,
derives at least in part from the perception that one's actions are volun-
tary. The choice to act morally is self-reinforcing, creating momentum for
acting morally on the next occasion, and the next, and strengthening the
foundation upon which future moral actions will be based. 8
The role of law in forming the social context within which parents
might internalize high ideals for responsibility and voluntarily proceed to
act upon them is a tricky one. Somehow the law must contribute to the
creation of high expectations for parents, while leaving sufficient leeway
so that parents are free to become responsible in the true sense. A hands-
off approach by the law to questions of parenthood would abdicate any
societal responsibility for norms of parenthood; yet a tight, comprehensive
set of controls would remove from parents the discretion to act, upon
which the capacity of moral decisionmaking actually depends.
Certain practical problems in regulating the behavior of parents toward
their children compound the difficulties for law. Parenting is both a de-
centralized and a continuous activity. Good parenting depends upon the
quality of hundreds of daily acts with respect to children.39 The state sim-
34. N. NODDINGS, supra note 26, at 5.
35. Id. at 80.
36. See J. DEWEY, OUTLINES OF A CRITICAL THEORY OF ETHics 160-61 (1957) ("We are
responsible for our conduct because that conduct is ourselves objectified in actions."). The theme of
responsibility as self-expression through obligation and service to others (or the Other) permeates
Christian theology; see, e.g., H. NIEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF 126 (1963) ("Responsibility af-
firms: 'God is acting in all actions upon you. So respond to all actions upon you as to respond to his
action.' ").
37. See F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, 11 183-88, 207-08 (T. Knox 1967) (1821). My
reading of Hegel on this point is derived from J. BLUSTEIN, PARENTS AND CHILDREN 93-95 (1982).
When the person cared for experiences the exercise of another's responsibility as voluntary, the
relationship becomes one that is affirming to both parties. See Hafen, supra note 9, at 499. Further,
responsibility motivates reciprocal commitments and loyalties that strengthen the underlying relation-
ship. See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 633 (1980).
38. See L. PETRAZYCKI, supra note 11, at 301 (repetition of moral acts influences capacity and
motivation to act morally in future).
39. Hafen, supra note 9, at 473.
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ply does not have the capacity to supervise such activity.4 Further,
parenting is an enterprise about which rules are of only very limited util-
ity to parents. The contexts within which parenting must take place are
defined by particularities that defy the kind of generalization upon which
rule-systems are based. A parent can find it next to impossible to apply
rules-even the parent's own rules-to every specific situation. Instead,
responses to situations must depend upon judgment developed through ex-
perience and example. Although rules help convey societal meaning to
parents about what generally is expected from them, these rules can do
little to cultivate a more universal judgment.
I explore how the law might best contribute to defining a norm of re-
sponsibility while still preserving maximum parental freedom and judg-
ment in context of specific custody conflicts. Before doing so, however, I
discuss briefly how my emphasis on the law's expressive effects relates to
the standard for resolving child custody disputes that is often contrasted
with parental rights-the "best interests of the child" test. Then, I address
the conflict between the community and the individual that is inherent in
my project to identify the societal norms the law should express.
3. Responsibility and the Best Interests of the Child
It is reasonable to ask at this point whether my focus on the law's ef-
fects on promoting parental responsibility for children represents any sort
of improvement on the best interests of the child standard. Is not the con-
cern for the responsibility of parents derived, after all, from our concern
for the welfare of children? And although substitute standards that make
the best interests of the child test more precise and administrable might be
welcome,4" isn't the standard of parental responsibility urged here even
more open-ended and amorphous?
In addressing this issue, I should note, first, that the best interests of the
child standard represents a considerable ideological and rhetorical ad-
vancement over child custody standards that focus on the parents' inter-
ests. Forcing parents to articulate their claims to children in terms of the
child's welfare expresses a societal preference for protecting children over
40. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 12, at 49-52.
41. The well-known proposals of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud and Albert Solnit are one exam-
ple of an effort to give concrete and practical meaning to the open-ended objective of serving the best
interests of children (or, as these authors put it, "the least detrimental alternative"). J. GOLDSTEIN,
A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 4, 12 (1979) [hereinafter
BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS] (policy of minimum state intervention accords with professional un-
derstanding of interests of child); BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 12, at 7-8 (reconciling
value preference in favor of holding child's needs paramount, and right of parents to raise their chil-
dren with minimum state intervention); see also Mnookin, supra note 13, at 292 (urging limitations
on judicial discretion when courts exercise child-protection function, because indeterminacy of best
interests of child test is "unjust and unwise"); Wald, supra note 14, at 992 (justifying presumption in
favor of parental autonomy both because of political commitment to diversity of lifestyles, and because
such a presumption "comports with our limited knowledge regarding childrearing").
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protecting adults, a preference which, though not inevitable,"2 is easily
defended.43
The best interests of the child standard, however, is not a satisfactory
substitute for rights doctrine in parenthood disputes. First, in an impor-
tant sense, the best interests standard merely substitutes the interests or
"rights" of one party-the child-for those of others. In this sense it does
not get away from rights doctrine, but rather makes the child, and not the
parents, the party whose rights are paramount.""
Further, the best interests of the child is a highly contingent social con-
struction. Although we often pretend otherwise, it seems clear that our
judgments about what is best for children are as much the result of politi-
cal and social judgments about what kind of society we prefer as they are
conclusions based upon neutral or scientific data about what is "best" for
children.' 5 The resolution of conflicts over children ultimately is less a
matter of objective fact-finding than it is a matter of deciding what kind of
children and families-what kind of relationships-we want to have.46
42. See Chambers, supra note 16, at 499-503 (reviewing reasons for considering interests of par-
ents as well as children); Elster, supra note 16 (arguing on behalf of best interests of adults).
43. See BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 12, at 105-11 (justifying paramouncy of
child's interests); BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 41, at 4-5 (child's well-being, not par-
ents', is determinative once state has intruded on family).
In their most recent work, the authors of these works use the term "ordinary devoted parent"
(borrowing from D. WINICOTT, THE ORDINARY DEVOTED MOTHER AND HER BABY (1949)) to
describe those in whose hands we should place authority for raising children. J. GOLDSTEIN, A.
FREUD, A. SOLNIT & S. GOLDSTEIN, IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 3 (1986). Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit take the devotion of a child's parent for granted (except where dear abuse is
shown), and argue that the ability to parent effectively requires broad autonomy. See supra note 41. I
agree with their emphasis on parental autonomy, but their principles are not designed to resolve
disputes between biological parents of the type raised in this article. Moreover, I argue that the law
has more to do than to allocate authority for children. As I try to show, the law speaks in many ways
to create and sustain social values. One way of viewing my project is to define, and determine how to
promote, the desired qualities of the "ordinary devoted parent."
44. See L. HOULGATE, FAMILY AND STATE: THE PHILOSOPHY OF FAMILY LAW 111 (1988).
45. The best interests test has long been under attack on the grounds that its results are indeter-
minate. See, e.g., Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other Fictions, 5
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 267 (1987); Elster, supra note 16, at 12-16; Mnookin, supra note 13, at
257-61. This indeterminacy, paradoxically, permits systematic bias. Feminists, for example, have at-
tacked the best interests test because it allows judges to bring their white, middle class biases into child
custody cases, biases which favor men over women. See P. CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL THE
BATrLE FOR CHILDREN AND CUSTODY 239-68 (1978); Polikoff, Why are Mothers Losing: A Brief
Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. RPTR. 235, 237-39,
241 (1982); Sheppard, Unspoken Premises in Custody Litigation, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rptr. 229, 233
(1982); Uviller, Fathers' Rights and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 107, 121-26 (1978). Other commentators have emphasized the systematic bias against
poor and minority families. BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 41, at 17; Wald, supra note
14, at 629.
46. See C. SMART, THE TIES THAT BIND: LAW, MARRIAGE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF PA-
TRIARCHAL RELATIONS 120-27 (1984); Bartlett & Stack, supra note 5, at 10-11; Dingwall & Eeke-
laar, Judgments of Solomon: Psychology and Family Law, in CHILDREN OF SOCIAL WORLDS 54 (M.
Richards & P. Light eds. 1986); Fineman & Opie, The Uses of Social Science Data in Legal Policy
Making: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 107, 157-58; Morgan, Making
Motherhood Male: Surrogacy and the Moral Economy of Women, 12 J. L. & SoC. 219, 223 (1985);
Zipper & Sevenjuijsen, Surrogacy: Feminist Notions of Motherhood Reconsidered, in REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER, MOTHERHOOD AND MEDICINE 118, 132 (M. Stanworth ed. 1987) [here-
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Finally, we care about the workings of these relationships not solely
because we care about children, but also because we care about the kind
of society in which we live. We want a society in which parent-child rela-
tionships are strong, secure, and nurturing. If we have to choose between
children and adults, we may prefer to be a society which puts the child's
interests first, but our larger concern is how the interests of both parent
and child link together in relationships. Responsibility is a critical dimen-
sion of these relationships. Parents being responsible for children, in other
words, fits the best picture we have of ourselves.
4. Responsibility, the Community, and the Individual
There is an extensive body of literature exploring the relationship be-
tween collective or communitarian definitions of the good and the rights of
the individual,4 which I cannot fully address here. A few general obser-
vations will help, however, in locating my article within that debate.
When I speak of societal construction of parenthood, I refer to a process
of community norm-building about what it means to be a parent. This
process might lead to the prohibition of individual choices. Communities
can be repressive."8 Thus individuals must, and do, sometimes resist, fend-
ing off the community as it attempts to shape individuals to its own vi-
sion." But the community is not all we have to fear. As I try to show in
inafter REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES].
This is not to suggest that social science data cannot be relevant. Once the necessary political
choices are made, the behavioral sciences may offer us useful information about how to achieve the
goals we have set for ourselves. See Melton, Developmental Psychology and the Law: The State of the
Art, 22 J. FAM. LAW 445 (1983-84) (describing current role of developmental psychology in inform-
ing legal determinations relating to children).
47. Some of the major examples of this literature include M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE
LIMTrrs OF JUSTICE (1982) (challenging deontological liberalism, which is based on view of society as
collection of individuals organized according to principles that do not presuppose any particular con-
ception of the good, in favor of constitutive view of community); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND
POLITICS 213-22 (1975) (expressing theory of self or individual in relation to community); Gutmann,
Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AnF. 308 (1985) (responding to communitar-
ian critics of liberal political theory); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 28 (1979) (demonstrating how within every legal problem, "the goal of individual
freedom is at the same time dependent on and incompatible with the communal coercive action that is
necessary to achieve it"); Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4,
21-24 (1986) (describing tensions within republican tradition between self-interest of individual and
values of community); Michelman,Justification (and Justifiability) of Law in a Contradictory World,
in JUSTIFICATION NoMos XXVIII 71 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1986) (asserting need for
justifiability of law notwithstanding inherent contradictions between individual freedom and collective
action) [hereinafter Michelman, Justification (and Justifiability)]; Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra
note 9 (developing theory of rights that recognizes values of community and responsibility); Sherry,
Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986)
(contrasting modern individualist and classical teleological paradigms); Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 19 (1985) (tracing historical roots of republicanism and its
competing models for reconciling interests of individuals with general good).
48. For an extreme, chilling account of a repressive societal redefinition of parenthood, see M.
ATWOOD, A HANDMAID'S TALE (1985).
49. Family law is rich with explicit examples of the successful resistance of individuals to efforts
of the community to standardize its members. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
506 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("the Constitution prevents East Cleveland from standardizing its chil-
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this article, the single-minded focus on the rights of individuals creates its
own dangers, with implications not only for those individuals but for the
community as well. The struggle between the community speaking in a
common voice and individuals speaking in many voices is a struggle inevi-
table in any society that attempts to set itself on liberal foundations. Be-
cause the interests of the individual and the will of the community are
necessarily in tension, the argument that individual interests (or the will
of the majority) is compromised can never constitute a final refutation of a
proposed solution to a political problem.5 °
Within the liberal society, part of the tension between individual and
community is relieved by the willingness of the community to set limits on
its repressive capacities. To resist the "tyranny of the majority," the lib-
eral community provides mechanisms by which the community evaluates
the claims of individuals. And to the extent that the community's rules
recognize the claims of individuals against the majority and respect indi-
vidual lifestyles and conceptions of responsibility, those claims in an im-
portant sense are rooted in the community. Tolerance of individual
choices, then, becomes part of the community's self-definition.
Reconciliation between the community as a collection of individuals,
and individuals who necessarily find themselves in community, also comes
as individuals struggling to achieve their own notions of responsibility in-
ternalize the norms and restraints of the community. This process, with
all of its tensions and conflicts, reflects our dual nature as both individuals
and social beings. We seek freedom within a community tht limits our
choices.5" We are potential agents of resistance in a community which
dren-and its adults-by forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns"); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state may not override individual rights of pregnant woman to choose
abortion by adopting one theory about when life begins); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-24
(1972) (in finding compulsory education laws to be unconstitutional violation of rights of Amish par-
ents to direct upbringing and education of their children, Court states: "There can be no assumption
that [the state's] majority is 'right' and the Amish . . . are 'wrong.' "); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (individual rights of parents abridged when state attempts to "standardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399-402 (1923) (desire of state legislature to foster homogeneous people by forbidding
foreign language instruction before eighth grade must give way to fundamental individual rights). But
see Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (individual rights of homosexual individuals do not
outweigh interests of majority of Georgia legislature in enforcing its moral standards through criminal
sodomy statutes).
50. This is not to imply that the individual and the community are necessarily in direct conflict,
or that our choice is between the individual and the community. See Gutmann, supra note 47 (re-
jecting dualistic thinking which assumes that we are constituted either as individuals or as members of
communities). It is, rather, to say that recognizing either the interests of the individual or the will of
the community will have unavoidable implications for the other.
51. Frank Michelman puts this point in the most positive possible light when he responds to
Duncan Kennedy's "heroic, mind-numbing[]" expose of the inherent contradictions of liberal legal
principles: "Duncan Kennedy's diagnosis of liberal legal pathology rests on the claim that the contra-
diction is, for us, an experience fearful and painful. That is not how it seems to me. I think the
contradiction is my friend; nay, my self." Michelman, Justification (and Justifiability), supra note 47,
at 94; see also Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle: A
Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REv. 509, 547 (1984) (dis-
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itself has formed us. We cannot resolve these tensions, but we must con-
front them as we address the here-before-us human conflicts that come to
the law for answers.
III. MOTHERS CHOOSING NONMARITAL PARENTHOOD
For women who either do not find or do not choose conventional,
heterosexual relationships within which to have children, a possible alter-
native is "nonmarital motherhood-by-choice." Their ability to pursue this
alternative can be frustrated in many ways. In this section, I begin by
sketching the disputes that may arise and the current legal framework for
resolving such disputes. I then set forth and evaluate specific legal claims
on behalf of nonmarital motherhood-by-choice. For the most part, these
claims are assertions of right that reflect the exchange view of parenthood,
and give little if any attention to the societal meanings attached to
parenthood. Finally, I explain how, in approaching the issues raised by
nonmarital motherhood-by-choice, we might attempt to develop more de-
sirable meanings of parenthood based upon the concept of responsibility
within relationship developed in Part II.
A. The Legal Background
Unmarried women claiming parental rights without interference from
the child's biological father run head-on into a legal tradition in family
law that assumes that every child should have two parents.52 The law has
not always insisted that these two parents be treated equally with respect
to custody, especially where the parents are unmarried. In many states
mothers have superior custodial rights5" and fathers, to have any rights at
all, need to take steps to perfect their rights that mothers need not take."
But if a father is intent upon doing so, he will ordinarily be able to assert
cussing interdependence of notions of individual autonomy and community).
52. See K. Bartlett, The Rule of Two Parents (1987) (unpublished manuscript).
53. See, e.g., Allen v. Childress, 448 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (mother is natural
guardian of child); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10 § 6 (1981), interpreted in In re Adoption of Baby Boy D.,
742 P.2d 1059, 1068 (Okla. 1985) ("The mother of an illegitimate minor is entitled to its custody.");
14 VT. STAT. ANN. § 2644 (Supp. 1988) (mother of illegitimate child is child's guardian); see also
Kuhmer v. Gibson, No. 81-924 (Ohio Ct. App. filed September 30, 1981) ("The mother of an illegiti-
mate child is its natural guardian and has the legal right to custody, care and control of such child
superior to the right of the natural father, or any other person, and is legally responsible for the care
and support of the child.") (citing In re Gutman, 22 Ohio App. 2d 125 (1969)).
54. For example, an unwed father may be required to acknowledge or legitimate his child for-
mally, or otherwise demonstrate responsibility for the child, before he will be afforded any rights to
the child. See, e.g., Smith v. Watson, 425 So. 2d 1030, 1033 (Miss. 1983) ("all things being equal
. . . the mother of an illegitimate child, if the mother is a suitable person, has the primary right to the
child's custody . . . . Upon acknowledging the child as his own, the father has an equal claim, with
the mother, to the parental and custodial rights to the child."); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-25 (Supp.
1988) ("[ojnly the mother of an illegitimate child is entitled to his custody, unless the father legiti-
mates him..."); see also infra text accompanying notes 97-99 (describing rules limiting fathers'
rights in adoption cases, unless father has taken steps to perfect his interests that mother is not re-
quired to take).
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some parental rights over the objection of a mother who seeks to raise the
child without him.5" In the event the mother seeking nonmarital mother-
hood-by-choice is a lesbian, the father may even win primary custody of
the child.56
An unmarried woman who seeks to conceive her child through artificial
insemination may seek application of the general rule that prevents sperm
donors from acquiring the legal rights and obligations of parenthood.
Most statutes creating this rule, however, apply only to children born of
married women. 5
7
One option for the unmarried woman is a formal agreement with the
sperm donor that he will have no rights or obligations with respect to the
child. Contracts explicitly releasing parents from support obligations,
however, are generally considered to be unenforceable as contrary to pub-
lic policy.58 Moreover, such contracts might well constitute evidence of
paternity, thus hindering rather than facilitating the mother's ability to
establish exclusive parental rights and obligations.59
Use of anonymous donors would be another possible solution for
women seeking exclusive parenthood: If no father can be identified, none
can be imposed. Anonymity, however, requires the involvement of a relia-
ble third party, and, if the woman prefers an established clinic, usually a
doctor. Some statutes, indeed, provide that artificial insemination may be
performed only under the supervision of a physician. 0 A woman who
55. See H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 199-200
(2d ed. 1988) (citing numerous cases).
56. Cases dealing with the issue of the fitness of an openly gay parent for custody of a child are
split. Some cases have held that a parent's homosexual activities should not be taken into account in a
child custody decision unless an adverse effect of these activities on the child is shown. See, e.g., D.H.
v. J.H., 418 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. App. 1981); Peyton v. Peyton, 457 So. 2d 321 (La. App. 1984); Doe v.
Doe, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 452 N.E.2d 293 (1983); Guinan v. Guinan, 102 A.D.2d 963, 477
N.Y.S.2d 830 (1984). But other cases assume that a parent's homosexual lifestyle is damaging to a
child. See, e.g., G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. App. 1987); Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 314 N.W.2d
78 (N.D. 1981); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 344 Pa.
Super. 49, 496 A.2d 1 (1985); Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641 (Utah 1980); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d
691 (Va. 1985).
57. The UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT, § 5(b), U.L.A. 301 (1987), followed in many states, provides:
"[tihe donor of semen . . . for use in artificial insemination of a married woman other than the
donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived." For a
comprehensive list of statutes covering artificial insemination, including those which have enacted
some version of the Uniform Parentage Act, see O'Rourke, Family Law in a Brave New World:
Private Ordering of Parental Rights and Responsibilities for Donor Insemination, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 140, 144-47 (1985). O'Rourke finds only six states that seem to contemplate artificial
insemination of unmarried women. Id. at 146 & 146 n.47. See CAL CIv. CODE ANN. § 7005(b)
(West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-106(2) (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 1983); OR.
REV. STAT. § 109.239(1) (1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050(2) (Supp. 1985); Wyo. Stat.
§ 14-2-103(b) (1986).
58. See Kern & Ridolfi, The Fourteenth Amendment's Protection of a Woman's Right to Be a
Single Parent Through Artificial Insemination by Donor, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. (Rutgers Univ.)
251, 257 n.35 (1982); Note, Contracts to Bear a Child, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 611, 613 (1978).
59. See Kern & Ridolfi, supra note 58, at 256; O'Rourke, supra note 57, at 160.
60. Statutes in fourteen states, including each of the six states which seem to permit artificial
insemination of unmarried women, see supra note 57, provide that the donor of semen used in artifi-
cial insemination is not deemed the natural father only where the sperm was provided to a licensed
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 98: 293
attempts to go through medical channels may face practical barriers. Phy-
sicians may refuse to perform artificial insemination on unmarried
women, in part because of uncertainty as to its legality,61 and in part out
of disapproval of the practice.62
Women seeking exclusive parenthood status, then, face considerable ob-
stacles. Where the biological father is known, virtually every state extends
legal parenthood status to that father. And where women seek anonymous
donors instead, no statutes give women greater access to medical channels
than doctors are willing to allow.
B. Rights Claims
1. Claims Based on Constitutional Precedent
Women seeking to overcome the obstacles to nonmarital parenthood-by-
choice have attempted to use constitutional arguments to overcome both
the legal barriers to exclusive custody and the reluctance of the medical
profession to perform artificial insemination. Unmarried women have
claimed a constitutional privacy right to conceive children through artifi-
physician. See O'Rourke, supra note 57, at 145 n.41. Three states allow only physicians to perform
artificial insemination, or impose criminal penalties on those who perform artificial insemination
without the supervision of a physician. See GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-42 (1984) (felony); IDAHO CODE
§§ 39-5402, 39-5407 (1985) (misdemeanor); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 677.360, 677.990 (1987)
(misdemeanor).
In a case decided under the California artificial insemination statute, a biological father who sought
to establish paternity and to exercise visitation rights with his child prevailed because the woman had
not used a doctor in her insemination procedure. Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 224
Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986).
Physicians almost always use anonymous donors only. One study showed that 91.8% of physicians
who perform artificial insemination will not allow the couple to select the donor, and for the others, it
is a rare practice. Curie & Cohen, Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the
United States, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 585, 586 (1979); see also Annas, Fathers Anonymous: Beyond
the Best Interests of the Sperm Donor, 14 FAM. L.Q. 1, 10 (1980).
61. See Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination: A Call for an
Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 1, 3-4 (1981).
62. The basic medical text on artificial insemination states that "any display of interest in [artifi-
cial insemination] by an unmarried woman is indicative of psychological distress .... " W. FINE-
GOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 101 (2d ed. 1976).
Even where doctors do not refuse to provide artificial insemination services to unmarried women,
women may feel that their "rights" to exclusive parenthood are not adequately ensured. First, the
procedures in doctor's hands can be costly. See Kritchevsky, supra note 61, at 29, n.144 (citing Miller,
Artificial Insemination, Boston Phoenix, June 19, 1979, sec. II, at 4, col. 1 ("Boston doctors' charges
were $75 for a pre-insemination workup and $125 to $150 an insemination cycle; clinics' charges
ranged from $60 to $75.")). Moreover, having to use the services of a doctor offends those who feel
that the simple, intimate procedure should be controlled by the parties involved, not third parties. See
G. COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE 43-46 (1985). Not an insignificant aspect of this phenomenon is
the desire by women to make a political statement that they should be able to control their own sexual
lives. See G. CASSIDY-BRINN, F. HORNSTEIN & C. DOWNER, WOMAN-CENTERED PREGNANCY AND
BIRTH, 3-9 (1984); A. DWORKIN, RIGHT-WING WOMEN 183-88 (1983); Hornstein, Children by
Donor Insemination: A New Choice for Lesbians, in TEST-TUBE WOMEN: WHAT FUTURE FOR
MOTHERHOOD 373, 377 (R. Arditti, R. Klein & S. Minden eds. 1984); Rich, Compulsoy Heterosex-
uality and Lesbian Existence, in POWERS OF DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 177 (A. Snitow,
C. Stansell & S. Thompson eds. 1983).
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cial insemination and to have exclusive rights to the child at birth."3 Advo-
cates have read the Supreme Court's privacy cases protecting individuals
against compulsory sterilization" and against state laws limiting access to
contraception65 and abortion 6 as affirming a right of procreation, availa-
ble to unmarried as well as married persons.67 Another privacy argument
made, which builds upon the suggestion in several Supreme Court opin-
ions that the state may not narrowly define the concept of "family," is
that an unmarried woman has the right to decide the composition of her
family.6"
Some commentators have also urged a right to nonmarital motherhood-
by-choice on equal protection grounds. For married women who have
conceived a child through artificial insemination, the general rule is that
the sperm donor has no rights. Allowing the married woman to achieve
parenthood exclusive of the sperm donor through artificial insemination
while denying the unmarried woman the same right, the argument goes,
constitutes an unconstitutional discrimination between married and un-
married women. 9
These constitutional arguments are highly problematic. First, the prece-
dents to which the privacy arguments appeal establish protection for indi-
viduals from state interference in activities relating to procreation and sex-
ual conduct.70 While this authority might preclude a state-imposed ban on
artificial insemination of unmarried women,71 it does not define an af-
firmative right to procreate that could be asserted against either the state
when it seeks to identify two biological parents for every child, or the
63. See, e.g., Kern & Ridolfi, supra note 58, at 283-84 (restrictions on access to professional
artificial insemination facilities and judicial enforcement of mother's right to custody against claims of
semen donor are unconstitutional); Kritchevsky, supra note 61, at 4-5 (arguing it would be unconsti-
tutional to outlaw artificial insemination for unmarried women); Lacey, The Law of Artificial Insemi-
nation and Surrogate Parenthood in Oklahoma: Roadblocks to the Right to Procreate, 22 TULSA
L.J. 281 (1987) (ban on artificial insemination for single women would be unconstitutional); Note,
Reproductive Technology and Procreation Rights of the Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REV. 669 (1985)
(arguing for constitutional right of access by unmarried women to reproductive technology); Com-
ment, Mother Knows Best: A Constitutional Perspective on Single Motherhood by Choice, 1984 S.
ILL. U.LJ. 329 (woman who chooses to be single mother has constitutional right to be free from risk
of interference from biological father or state).
64. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
65. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(plurality opinion).
66. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
67. See Note, supra note 63, at 675-78.
68. See Donovan, supra note 7, at 227-29.
69. See Kern & Ridolfi, supra note 58, at 275-76; Note, supra note 63, at 679.
70. Not even all of these activities have been protected. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct.
2841 (1986) (upholding sodomy laws); Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S.
464 (1981) (upholding statutory rape laws).
71. Lacey, supra note 63 (arguing that ban on artificial insemination for single women would be
unconstitutional). The only state which appears to ban artificial insemination of single women is
Oklahoma. See 15 Op. Okla. Att'y Gen. 277 (1983) (interpreting Artificial Insemination Statute,
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 551-53 (1981) and Trafficking in Children Statute, OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §
866 (1981)).
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medical profession when it limits access to anonymous insemination proce-
dures for unmarried women." Under conventional constitutional analysis,
the unwillingness of doctors to perform artificial insemination on unmar-
ried women would seem no more objectionable (alas) than the unwilling-
ness of some physicians to perform abortions"3 or some states to fund
them.74
The constitutional precedent upon which the equal protection presump-
tion for single motherhood-by-choice is based is similarly unpersuasive.
While the Supreme Court has held that unmarried women are entitled to
some of the same procreative rights as married women,7 5 none of its deci-
sions requires equal treatment of married and unmarried parents.76 Like-
wise, no Supreme Court case has the effect of requiring a state to limit its
recognition of parenthood to one parent or the other. Indeed, those cases
recognizing a privacy interest of parents in their children have applied to
fathers as well as mothers.77
72. D'Aversa, The Right of Abortion in Surrogate Motherhood Arrangements, 7 N. ILl_ U.L.
REv. 1, 20-26 (1987); Smith & Iraola, Sexuality, Privacy and the New Biology, 67 MARQ. L. REv.
263, 281, 285, 289-91 (1984). But see Note, supra note 63, at 677 (although Supreme Court cases do
not address each aspect of procreation process, together they can best be explained as elaborating more
general right of privacy with respect to all aspects of procreation).
Catharine MacKinnon has argued that we should not be surprised to find that courts have not
defined privacy interests to give much autonomy to women, because the privacy doctrine itself is a tool
of male supremacy: "[Tihe law of privacy works to translate traditional social values into the rhetoric
of individual rights as a means of subordinating those rights to specific social imperatives [footnote
omitted] . . . [i.e.] the imperatives of male supremacy." C. MACKINNON, FrmiNisM UNMODIFIED:
DIscouRSEs ON LIFE AND LAW 97 (1987).
73. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (provisions of Georgia statute requiring that physi-
cian's decision whether to perform abortion rest upon his best clinical judgment not unconstitutionally
vague); see also MD. HEALTH-GFN. CODE ANN. § 20-214 (a)-(b) (1987) (physicians not required to
perform, and hospitals not required to permit abortion, sterilization, or artificial insemination).
Similarly, state requirements that artificial insemination procedures be performed only by doctors
would not seem to be unconstitutional, so long as they appear to be a reasonable means of screening
donors for genetic defects or infectious diseases. See Curie & Cohen, supra note 60, at 585-87. De-
spite the Supreme Court's recognition of the strength of the woman's right to choose an abortion, see
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), a number of regulations bearing on that right have been justified
as reasonable means of serving important state health objectives; see, e.g., Planned Parenthood v.
Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 486-90 (1983) (upholding requirement that fetal tissue be examined by
pathologist); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65-67, 79-81 (1976) (upholding certain
consent and record-keeping provisions).
74. See Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (city's refusal to provide publicly financed hospital
services for nontherapeutic abortions while providing such services for childbirth did not deny equal
protection).
75. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to access to contraception).
76. The Court has made it quite dear that under certain circumstances, it is constitutional to treat
unmarried fathers differently from married fathers. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983);
Quillon v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
77. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), for
example, both protected the rights of unwed fathers to their children. More recently, Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), in defining a fundamental liberty interest of "natural parents" in the
care, custody, and management of their children, referred to both parents.
Re-Expressing Parenthood
2. Claims To Extend Constitutional Precedent
What commentators may mean in asserting the right of unmarried
women to become parents with exclusive parental rights is that our law
ought to protect women's ability to procreate through artificial insemina-
tion and retain autonomy over the children so conceived-in other words,
that this right is a reasonable extension of existing legal precedent. The
most attractive arguments upon which this normative claim is based stress
the values of tolerance, diversity, and private choice; these arguments,
however, ultimately fail.
For example, women seeking nonmarital motherhood-by-choice may
claim the right to be free from an imposed majority point of view-the
view that parenthood is a shared, two-parent enterprise and that it is in
the child's best interest to have two parents. This argument ignores the
fact that the acceptance of any lifestyle choices on the part of some mem-
bers of the community is likely to impose an undesirable or offensive point
of view on others. If unmarried women prevail on their claims to have
unhindered, exclusive nonmarital parenthood, they would be impressing
their own view of the community on others. Whether this view is under-
stood to be that nonmarital parenthood is an acceptable social form, or
that individuals should be free to choose their own definition of family, it
is a moral view that is potentially offensive to those upon whom it is
imposed. Neither this position, nor any other, is neutral, nonmoral, or
tolerant of all other (competing) moralities.
Another, no more successful, approach is to characterize the activities
women seek to protect through their claims for exclusive parenthood as
private rather than public, and thus beyond the appropriate reach of state
regulation. This argument does not focus on the individual's resistance to
the state as the tool of the majority, generally, but rather attempts to lo-
cate claims in a zone-the "private" zone-within which the state ac-
knowledges it should not act. This effort is similarly doomed. Others have
shown that the private/public dichotomy in family law is illusory: The
regulation of, and the failure to regulate, family matters equally reflect
public decisions about the family, not all of them benign."8
Beyond the analytical difficulties of the rights arguments made on be-
half of nonmarital motherhood-by-choice, these claims have ideological
consequences that affect the social meaning of parenthood and how people
perceive their legal and social obligations. The rights arguments summa-
rized above construct the terms of conflict in ways which emphasize the
exclusive interests of disputing owners. As a claim of right, the claim for
nonmarital motherhood-by-choice affirms the selfish rather than loving
78. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 1497 (1983); see also C. MAcKINNON, supra note 72, at 100-02 (public/private distinction is
important part of ideology of women's subordination).
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and committed aspect of the parent-child relationship.7' Likewise, claims
by biological fathers in opposition to mothers' claims draw the battle lines
in terms of possession through blood, rather than as a difficult conflict
between adults offering relationships to infants to whom they wish to be
responsible.
In the next section, I demonstrate how we might proceed to analyze
these issues if we want to re-express parenthood to elevate values of re-
sponsibility over those of individual right or entitlement.
C. Relationship, Responsibility, and Nonmarital Motherhood-by-Choice
Fashioning rules to enhance responsibility by adults for their children
in response to women's claims of exclusive nonmarital parenthood-by-
choice would immediately devolve into disagreement about the definition
or meaning of "responsible conduct." Deciding upon a conceptual
goal-furthering responsibility within the parent-child relation-
ship-helps set the stage for debate but does little to allay the essential
value conflicts underlying questions of parenthood.
The arguments asserted in debate over nonmarital motherhood-by-
choice reflect the depth of these value conflicts. On one side, some will
argue that it is irresponsible to conceive deliberately and raise children
outside a nuclear family; that it is harmful to a child not to have a fa-
ther; 0 and, for lesbian mothers who seek exclusive, nonmarital
parenthood that it is irresponsible to expose children to a homosexual
lifestyle. " ' On the other side, some will argue that women who wish to
bear and raise a child on their own demonstrate a high degree of commit-
ment and responsibility. These women are even more likely to act respon-
sibly, the argument goes, than those who become pregnant without
thought, or because social convention congratulates them for doing so. 82
Moreover, these women seek to act upon an impulse that society both
recognizes as necessary to continue the species, and assumes in assigning
the job of childrearing to parents. Under this view, impediments to
79. 1 do not mean to suggest that rights arguments have these negative consequences only when
single women use them to assert claims to parenthood. Several feminists have noted that married
women who want children are applauded while single women who want children are deemed egoistic.
See, e.g., MacIntyre, 'Who Wants Babies?' The Social Construction of Instincts, in SEXUAL Divi-
SIONS AND SOCIErY (D.L. Barker & S. Allen eds. 1976); Zipper & Sevenjuijsen, supra note 46, at
131. My point is, rather, that the style of rights arguments tends to promote egoistic instincts among
all claimants.
80. See McGuire & Alexander, Artificial Insemination of Single Women, 43 FERTILrrY AND
STERILITY 182 (1985) (reporting concern of some physicians, and disputing basis thereof, that lack of
father could affect child financially, socially, and cognitively).
81. Id. at 183. Few commentators state this argument directly, though it is implied in much of the
literature. See, e.g., Annas, supra note 60, at 5-6 (artificial insemination of lesbian justified only by
best interests of adults, not best interests of children). The assumption that homosexuality in parents
is bad for children has been made by numerous courts in custody cases. See supra note 56.
82. See Note, supra note 63, at 680 n.64.
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women seeking exclusive parenthood status weaken the norm of
responsibility.
These arguments reflect different values and different assumptions
about human nature. Disputes over the "needs" of children are frequently
a cover for these unstated assumptions."3 The nonmarital motherhood-by-
choice debate, in particular, is fueled by numerous studies meant to illus-
trate the advantages and disadvantages of allowing children to live in sin-
gle-parent households." These studies, however, fail to inform the central
political question of what kinds of families our society is prepared to al-
low or encourage.
One fact relevant to this political question is that society already de-
pends heavily upon unmarried women to raise its children. Twenty-two
percent of children grow up in single-parent families, 5 most of which are
headed by women." Women most often get custody of children following
divorce.87 Even when children live with their fathers in two-parent fami-
lies, we know that a greatly disproportionate share of child-rearing re-
sponsibilities are assumed by women. 8
These factors may be relevant in different ways. One might argue, for
example, that women child-raisers are entitled to the privileges associated
with the responsibilities they have assumed. But this is an argument
within the exchange view of parenthood; it constructs parenthood in terms
of entitlement, based upon acts performed and expectations met.
An alternative view based on the cited data is that parenthood is exer-
cised by single parents, and the state should encourage it to be exercised
well. Single parenthood, even if society continues to consider it a second-
best solution, is not per se inadequate or irresponsible. Allowing or recog-
nizing nonmarital motherhood-by-choice, and associating with it the usual
expectations we have for parents-a parent's love for her child, her identi-
83. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
84. Many of these studies are reviewed in Chambers, supra note 16, at 503-41. Cf. Teitelbaum,
Moral Discourse, 84 MICH. L. REV. 430, 437-39 (1985) (research bases for various, and contrary,
hypotheses of family law are unreliable).
85. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
SERIES P-20, No. 380, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH 1982 Table E, at 5
(1983).
86. According to U.S. Census figures, about 90 percent of children who live with one parent live
with their mothers. Id. at 4.
87. While reliable national figures are not available, Lenore Weitzman found that in the counties
she examined in California, well over 80 percent of physical custody awards went to women. L.
WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 227-28 (1985).
88. P. BLUMSTEIN & P. SHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK AND SEX 144-50
(1983) (reporting 1982 study showing that among couples where both partners are employed full-
time, 18% of wives do more than 20 hours of housework (including childcare) weekly, as opposed to
4% of husbands). Figures comparing the extent of responsibility assumed by parents in dual-career
families may vary widely, depending in part on who is doing the measuring. In one 1985 study, for
example, 57% of fathers said they were as involved in parenting as the mothers, while only 32% of
independent raters found equal involvement. Thirty-eight percent of fathers rated themselves as less
involved than the mothers, while the independent raters set the figure at 54%. See L. GILBERT, MEN
IN DUAL-CAREER FAMILIES: CURRENT REALITIES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 74-75 (1985).
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fication with that child, her desire to have that child "turn out
well"-reinforce those attributes of parenthood that we want all parents,
nonmarital as well as married, to develop. Given how widely experienced
single parenthood is, it may seem desirable to affirm, rather than deny or
further denigrate, its existence.89
Other desirable values may also be transmitted through an acceptance
of nonmarital motherhood-by-choice. Nonmarital motherhood-by-choice
is, by definition, intentional. Whether we should view responsible
parenthood as intentional is, again, a contestable political issue. According
to one view, a significant and positive aspect of the parent-child relation-
ship is that it is unpredictable, a matter of spiritual grace to be welcomed
if it comes one's way, and thus not an appropriate subject of human con-
trol.90 Under this view, efforts to control one's procreative activities are
wrong and irresponsible. Under the contrary view, planned parenthood is
responsible, and unplanned reproduction, especially if one is unable to
care properly for one's children, is irresponsible.91 To the extent we mean
to promote deliberate choice in parenthood-to endorse family planning as
part of parental responsibility-recognition of nonmarital motherhood-by-
choice (and perhaps nonmarital fatherhood-by-choice as well) may make
sense.
When an unmarried mother's claim for exclusive custody arises in the
context of a custody dispute with a father who originally agreed to take no
part in the child's parenting, there is the further question whether we
should attach any significance to a claimant's previous decision not to as-
sume parental responsibilities."2 Should the father be obligated to abide by
his initial commitment not to assert parental rights to the child? Whatever
we decide, our reasons should be clear. The father should not be disquali-
89. One contrary view is that we should distinguish between unintended single-parent families
(brought about by death, divorce, desertion, or unintended out-of-wedlock childbirth) which we can do
little to prevent, and intended single-parent families over which we have more control. Since Aristotle,
we have assumed that deliberate acts may be more blameworthy, because they could have been pre-
vented, than unintentional acts. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS Book V, ch. 8 (M. Ostwald
trans. 1962); sec also H.L.A. HART, supra note 26, at 113-35 (reviewing issues relating to intention
and punishment). By the same token, if the law tolerates practices in which people engage deliber-
ately, it is endorsing those practices to a greater extent than it does when it tolerates situations that
come about accidentally. I acknowledge this argument, but conclude that the need to dispel the stigma
against single parenthood, as well as the benefits of encouraging intentionality in parenthood, see
infra text accompanying note 91, outweigh the values served by discouraging the less favored forms of
intentional single parenthood.
90. See K. LutER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 167-71 (1984) (describing
value of unplanned conception to "pro-life" view of world).
91. See generally S. SPICKER, W. BONDESON & H. ENGELHARDT, JR., THE CONTRACEPTIVE
ETHOS: REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (1987).
92. This issue echoes a similar one that arises in the context of custody disputes arising from
surrogacy arrangements. See infra Part V.
There have been no reported cases involving a woman seeking to establish her claim to nonmarital
motherhood-by-choice that neatly raise this issue. In the few custody disputes where it has arisen, the
mother was unable to establish convincingly the father's intention not to assume responsibility for the
child. See Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986) (dispute of fact
over terms of arrangement); C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (1977) (same).
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fied because by his earlier decision he has shown that he does not "de-
serve" to be a parent. Likewise, if we extend to the father status as par-
ent, it should not be because notwithstanding his intentions he might be
held financially responsible for the child and thus should be given recipro-
cal rights as well; or because his donation of sperm gives him a "right" to
the child. These reasons all make parenthood turn on fault, entitlement:
exchange.
Instead, our reasons should turn on our assessment of which connec-
tions between parent and child are most important to validate. We would
like to attach positive value to the biological connection of both parents,
but when this is not possible, we may choose to prefer a planned relation-
ship over one that was not only unplanned, but affirmatively unwanted.
We may also want to take account of the different degrees of relationship
that have been formed. At the time of childbirth, the mother's relationship
to her child has developed through pregnancy and childbirth. In contrast,
the father's relationship is only a potential one. Affirming the mother's
connection to the child (rather than her "rights" or the father's absence
thereof) strengthens the importance of relationship to our understanding
of parenthood.
The choice of how to state our reasons for recognizing, or declining to
recognize, parental claims is a rhetorical move, but nonetheless important.
The law's rhetoric defines norms that parties reproduce when they arti-
culate their claims in certain ways. To the extent we may determine that
the unmarried woman's decision to have children is a moral one which we
should allow her to make, it is important to avoid expressing this freedom
as the woman's inviolable "right"; rather, it should be justified as a com-
ponent of responsible parenthood. If we disapprove of her decision, we
should express this disapproval not in terms of the man's "right," but in
terms of our intended meaning of parenthood. We might also disapprove
of her decision, but not enough to prohibit it.93 Then, too, we must be
mindful of whether the way we justify this result expresses the values we
seek to advance. If parental responsibility is high among those values, the
rhetoric of rights is ill-suited to the task.
IV. UNMARRIED MOTHERS CHOOSING TO PLACE THEIR CHILDREN
FOR ADOPTION
Cases in which a biological father objects to a mother's attempt to place
the newborn child for adoption also present numerous issues relating to
the societal meanings of responsibility within parent-child relationships.
93. Suzanna Sherry suggests this model for state disapproval, without prohibition, of pornogra-
phy. Sherry, supra note 6, at 988-89. She notes that this model appears to be the one the United
States Supreme Court has adopted with respect to abortion law: A woman has a right to an abortion,
but the government may discourage abortions at least to a point, such as by withholding public fund-
ing for them. Id. at 989 n.116.
19883
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 98: 293
Both the current legal framework for resolving these cases, and rights
claims made to break through that framework, fail to address these issues
adequately.
A. The Legal Background
A father's objection to a woman's attempt to relinquish their child to a
third-party couple for adoption generates conflicting impulses within the
law. On the one hand, giving the unwed father the full range of parental
rights when the unwed mother decides to give up her rights seems only
fair to the father, and serves the goal of assuring the child at least one
"natural" parent. On the other hand, a newborn who is adopted into a
two-parent nuclear family is presumed to have advantages over a child
raised by a single parent." State laws reflect this tension. Generally
speaking, when the unmarried mother gives up her child for adoption, the
biological father who meets the specified statutory criteria becomes the
mother's substitute, with the power to stop the adoption and take custody
of the child himself."' The mother's action in placing the child for adop-
tion constitutes, in effect, a forfeiture of her otherwise superior rights. If
she chooses not to exercise those rights by retaining custody of the child,
the father's rights take over."
The statutory criteria that unmarried fathers must meet, however, may
be quite rigorous, facilitating the ability of the unmarried mother to place
her child for adoption. Applied strictly, these criteria in some instances
may have the effect of treating a decision by the mother to place her child
for adoption as an exercise of her (superior) parental rights rather than as
94. Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Serv. Bureau, 222 Neb. 574, 385 N.W.2d 448, 452 (1986) (citing
public policy in favor of adoption of children born out of wedlock as soon as possible after birth, and
stability of normal, two-parent home), appeal dismissed as moot, 479 U.S. 805 (1986); In re Joseph
L.L., 97 A.D.2d 263, 470 N.Y.S.2d 784, 786 (1983) (in upholding statute eliminating need for con-
sent to adoption by natural parent who has been imprisoned, court discusses state legitimate interest
in providing child with stability of normal two-parent home); In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742
P.2d 1059, 1068 (Okla. 1985) (best interests of child born to unmarried parents is adoption); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979) ("We do not question that the best interests of. . . [illegiti-
mate] children often may require their adoption into new families who will give them the stability of a
normal, two-parent home."). For a different statement of this dilemma, see Buchanan, The Constitu-
tional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 314-15
(1984) (adoption has double effect on parental interests, by both establishing one set of parental rela-
tionships and terminating another).
95. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-106(A)(1) (1974 & Supp. 1986); CAL. CIV. CODE §
224 (West 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-6 (Burns 1987); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 5-311
to -312 (1984); MiCn. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 710.31 (West Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-7
(1987).
96. See Adoption of Baby Boy D., 159 Cal. App. 3d 8, 23, 205 Cal. Rptr. 361, 369 (1984) ("So
long as [the mother] does not assert [her] right to physical custody, [the father] may not be denied
custody of his child or have his parental rights terminated except upon a finding that leaving custody
with [the adoptive parents] is necessary to avert harm to the child."); In re Baby Boy Barlow, 404
Mich. 216, 273 N.W.2d 35 (1978) (if unwed mother releases child for adoption, father's parent-child
relationship may be terminated only if it is shown that to do so would be in child's best interests); In
re Mitchell, 70 A.D.2d 367, 421 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1979) (unwed father entitled to custody if mother
releases child for adoption and if there is no showing that father is unfit).
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a forfeiture of them. For example, a number of state statutes make the
consent of an unwed father unnecessary to the child's adoption if the fa-
ther has not formally acknowledged his paternity,9" had his paternity judi-
cially established,98 or provided substantial financial support or consistent
care to the child.9" Some states have very limited notice provisions,100 or
require no notice to fathers at all under certain circumstances."'1 Where
consent is required, the father's parental rights may be overcome in some
states under standards more lenient than those that apply in other custody
contexts. 0 2 These rules reflect a concern for the mother to be able to
97. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-9-206 (1987) (natural father's consent to adoption required
only if he is (or was) married to mother, or if he has custody, or if he has legitimated the child),
upheld in In re S.J.B., 745 S.W.2d 606 (Ark. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.062, 63.072(1) (West
1986) (natural father's consent not necessary where he has not filed acknowledgement of paternity),
interpreted in Wylie v. Botos, 416 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
30-4(3) (1987) (unwed father's parental rights may be terminated without his consent if he fails to
file notice of paternity prior to filing of petition for adoption), interpreted in In re Baby Boy Doe,
717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986); see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104.02 (1984) (unwed father has no
parental rights unless he files notice of intent to claim paternity within five days after child's birth),
interpreted in Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Serv. Bureau, 222 Neb. 574, 385 N.W.2d 448 (1986); OR.
REV. STAT. § 109.096(3) (1984) (unwed father barred from contesting adoption proceeding if he does
not file notice of initiation of filiation proceedings before placement for adoption), interpreted in
G.S.B. v. S.M.D., 720 P.2d 1339 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
98. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-6(g)(2)(A) (Burns 1980) (natural father's consent not
necessary where his paternity has not been judicially established), interpreted in M.R. v. Meltzer,
487 N.E.2d 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
99. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9.3-46 (West Supp. 1988) (unwed father may object to adop-
tion if he acknowledges child, unless court finds substantial failure to perform regular and expected
parental functions of care and support, including maintenance of emotional relationship); N.Y. DOM.
REL LAW § 111 (McKinney 1986) (if a child is less than six months old, father must have lived
openly with mother or child, held himself out as father, and paid reasonable medical expenses of
pregnancy; if child is older than six months, father must have had substantial and repeated contacts
with child, including support, regular visitation or communication); OHto REv. CODE ANN. §§
3107.06-.07 (Anderson Supp. 1987) (putative father cannot object to adoption if he has abandoned
mother during her pregnancy and up to time of surrender, or has wilfully abandoned or failed to care
for and support child).
100. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1105, 1106, 1113 (1981) (if mother refuses to disclose
name of unwed father, court may terminate father's parental rights without notice to him in order to
enable child to be adopted more readily), interpreted in In re Karen A.B., 513 A.2d 770 (Del. 1986);
VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225 (1987) (unwed father's consent not required if his identity is not "reason-
ably ascertainable" or if father is given notice but fails to object to adoption within 21 days; unrefuted
affidavit of mother stating that identity not reasonably ascertainable sufficient), interpreted in Au-
gusta County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Unnamed Mother, 348 S.E.2d 26 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (publi-
cation notice sufficient to meet requirement of statute).
101. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (upholding N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-
a(2)(a)-(h) (McKinney 1988), which requires notice of adoption proceedings to putative fathers in
number of circumstances, but not where putative father has filed paternity action that has not been
resolved but of which mother and state have notice); see also In re Karen A.B., 513 A.2d 770 (Del.
1986) (no notice to putative father in third-party adoption proceeding, where mother refused to dis-
close his name and testified that he would be unable to care for child); infra note 114.
102. Thus, although the United States Supreme Court indicated that the rights of a father who is,
or was, married to the child's mother ordinarily cannot be terminated without a showing of unfitness,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of a Georgia statute which provided that the rights of a father
who had not legitimated his child could be cut off through adoption, and that legitimation could be
denied on the basis of the best interests of the child standard. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255
(1978), citing Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring); see also N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 11 1-a(3) (McKinney 1988) (limiting participation of unwed
fathers in adoption hearings to presenting information and arguments about child's best interests);
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.01(3), 12.02(c), 13.21 (Vernon 1986) (allowing legitimation petition of
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make a decision about adoption as quickly as possible for the benefit of
the child, with the knowledge that the father will be unable to thwart her
plan.103
It is clear from the Supreme Court's opinion in Caban v. Moham-
med,1" that a father who has actually assumed significant responsibility
toward his child or developed a meaningful parent-child relationship has
parental rights which may not be abrogated simply at the will of the
mother.'05 What is less clear is whether the father must be given the op-
portunity to establish such a relationship. Some courts have decided that
he must;106 others have disagreed.'07 In Lehr v. Robertson, the United
States Supreme Court stated that "[tihe significance of the biological con-
nection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other
unwed father to be denied under best interests standard), upheld in In re T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d 793
(Tex. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981).
103. See, e.g., Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Serv. Bureau, 222 Neb. 574, 579, 385 N.W.2d 448,
452 (1986) (warning against leaving mother "in the terrible limbo of growing attachment and love for
the child, awaiting either the outcome of a judicial proceeding with its attendant notoriety or the
decision of the amorous Hamlet in the wings, pondering whether he should assume his
responsibility.").
104. 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (holding that parental rights of father who had established significant
relationship with his children were constitutionally protected and could not be terminated by stepfa-
ther's adoption of child).
105. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) ("When an unwed father demonstrates a
full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'coming forward to participate in the rearing
of his child,' Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 392, his interest in personal contact with his child
acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause.").
Those cases that deny a father the right to block an adoption frequently note the failure of the
father to care for the child and mother. See, e.g., In re Marie R., 79 Cal. App. 3d 624, 145 Cal. Rptr.
122, 123 (1978) (despite efforts to do so, putative father had never seen baby, and had not contributed
to baby's or mother's expenses); In re Steve B.D., 112 Idaho 22, 730 P.2d 942 (1986) (father did not
pay medical expenses related to birth or any expenses related to child's support, and refused request
to sign paternity affidavit); Shoecraft v. Catholic Social Serv. Bureau, 222 Neb. at 576, 385 N.W.2d
at 450 (father did not pay expenses connected with residence of mother before birth or costs of hospi-
tal and physician connected with child's birth, and did not complete medical questionnaires sent to
him); In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1068 (Okla. 1985) (father did not contact
mother during her pregnancy, and did not offer financial support). See also supra note 99 and infra
note 139.
In California, the rules determining who must consent to an adoption directly incorporate the sorts
of factors that have been given constitutional recognition. California distinguishes between a "pre-
sumed" father and a "natural" father. A presumed father is a natural father who has married or
attempted to marry the child's mother within a certain time period, or who has received the child into
his home and openly held out the child as his natural child. CAL- CIV. CODE § 7004 (West 1983).
Only the consent of a presumed father is necessary in order for his child to be adopted, CAL Civ.
CODE § 224 (West 1982); the consent of a natural father who is not a presumed father is not re-
quired. California law requires, however, that a natural father be notified of an adoption proceeding
in order to ensure that he is given the opportunity to prove that he is a presumed father. CAL Civ.
CODE §§ 7017(c) & (d) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987). For cases interpreting these rules, see infra note
115.
106. See, e.g., Adoption of Baby Boy D., 159 Cal. App. 3d 8, 205 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1984) (dis-
cussed infra note 115); Matter of Baby Girl Eason, 257 Ga. 292, 358 S.E.2d 459 (1987).
107. See cases discussed infra notes 111-116. In those states in which notice to a known father is
not required, see supra notes 100-01, it is unclear how a father would be able to raise the issue of
what responsibilities he had assumed toward the child. Without stating so, courts may assume that if
a mother is able to slip an adoption proceeding by the husband unnoticed, he has probably not estab-
lished a relationship to the child of sufficient strength to warrant special constitutional protection.
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male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring."108 Yet in
Lehr, the Court found that the state was not constitutionally required to
give the father notice and an opportunity to be present at the adoption
proceedings, even though he tried to establish a link with the child (in-
cluding offering to support the mother during and after her pregnancy,
and attempting to visit the child); his inability to take on responsibility for
the child was due not to his inaction, but to the mother's lack of
cooperation.' 0 '
The Court in Lehr was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that for five
years, the child had lived with the stepfather, who wished to adopt the
child."' A number of lower courts, however, have declined to recognize
that the father has a constitutional right to notification, even in the context
of adoption by third parties. In one such case, the Idaho Supreme Court
held that although the state may not deprive the father of the opportunity
to assert his interest in the child, the mother herself may do so." An
adoption is not defective just because the mother has concealed the child
from the father and prevented him from developing a relationship with
that child." 2 The Texas Supreme Court also has concluded that an un-
wed father who repeatedly attempts to establish a relationship with his
infant might, nevertheless, have no parental rights if the mother succeeds
in denying him access.' 13 Courts in Arkansas and Oregon have followed
suit, 414 while courts in California" 5 and Utah" 6 have shifted back and
forth on the issue.
108. 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
109. Id. at 268-76 (White, J., dissenting). The father could have filed a notice of his paternity in
the putative father registry, but failed to do so, perhaps because he uas unaware of the alternative. Id.
at 262.
110. Id. at 262 n.19. See Buchanan, supra note 94, at 371-81 (suggesting that opportunity inter-
est of biological father in adoption by strangers case should be greater than his opportunity interest in
stepparent adoption case).
111. In re Steve B.D., 112 Idaho 22, 25, 730 P.2d 942, 945 (1986) ("The fleeting opportunity
may pass ungrasped through no fault of the unwed father or perhaps due to the interference of some
private third party; nevertheless, once passed the unwed father is left without an interest cognizable
under the Fourteenth Amendment." (citation omitted)).
112. In re Steve B.D., 112 Idaho 22, 730 P.2d 942 (1986). This case followed an unsuccessful
attempt by the mother of the child to revoke her consent to the adoption. See In re Steve B.D., 111
Idaho 285, 723 P.2d 829 (1986). The mother and the father subsequently declared a common law
marriage, but by then, the child had been with the adoptive parents for more than two years. Id. at
290-92, 723 P.2d at 834-36.
The lack of involvement of the state in preventing the biological father from developing a relation-
ship with the child was also a factor noted by the California Supreme Court in upholding a state
statute that denied standing to a putative father to attack the presumption of legitimacy. See Michelle
W. v. Ronald W., 39 Cal. 3d 354, 362, 216 Cal. Rptr. 748, 752, 703 P.2d 88, 92, (1985), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Michelle W. v. Riley, 106 S. Ct. 774 (1986).
113. In re T. E. T., 603 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981).
114. See In re S.J.B., 14 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1223 (Ark. 1988) (upholding ARK. STAT. ANN. §§
9-9-206(a)(2) & 9-9-207(a)(3) (1987) which permit adoption by third-party strangers without notice
to unwed father who did not have custody of child, marry child's mother or legitimate child, where
father was unaware of child's birth); G.S.B. v. S.M.D., 720 P.2d 1339 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) (applying
OR. REV. STAT. § 109.096(3) (1987), which cuts off rights of putative father without notice if he does
not file filiation proceeding before child is placed in adoptive home).
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B. Rights Claims
Women seeking to overcome rules giving unwed fathers veto power over
adoptions, or to defend rules that allow them to make the adoption deci-
sion without interference by the father, make rights claims that, again,
start with the proposition that the woman's right to place her child for
adoption is compelled by her privacy interest in deciding "'whether to
bear or beget a child'.1117 The argument is sometimes bolstered by the
claim that "since the mother had the absolute right to decide to abort and
115. In In re Tricia M., 74 Cal. App. 3d 125, 141 Cal. Rptr. 554 (1977), the California Court of
Appeals held that an unwed father must be given the opportunity to develop a relationship with his
child before the child could be placed for adoption based only on the consent of the mother. In Adop-
tion of Marie R., 79 Cal. App. 3d 624, 630, 145 Cal. Rptr. 122, 126 (1978), however, the Court of
Appeals allowed a third-party adoption notwithstanding the father's objection that the child's mother
had prevented him from developing a relationship with the child; the court held that the mother's
conduct in frustrating the father's efforts to establish contact was an insufficient reason to deny the
adoption. Then, in W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 310-11, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862,
866-67 (1979), approving Marie R. and questioning the "unwarranted" advice given by the Tricia
M. court, the Court of Appeals held that the father need not be given the opportunity to establish a
relationship that the mother had refused to allow to develop. Still another shift occurred in Adoption
of Baby Boy D., 159 Cal. App. 3d 8, 205 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1984), when the Court of Appeals held that
a father's rights to due process of law mandated the application of the parental preference doctrine. So
long as the mother did not assert her right to custody, the court stated, the biological father could not
be denied custody or have his parental rights terminated except on a finding that leaving custody with
the adoptive parents was necessary to prevent harm to the child. 159 Cal. App. 3d at 22, 205 Cal.
Rptr. at 369.
California's Supreme Court has done nothing to clarify the issue. In In re Baby Girl M., 37 Cal.3d
65, 207 Cal. Rptr. 309, 688 P.2d 918 (1984), the state Supreme Court appeared to assume that an
opportunity should be given to a natural father to establish a relationship with his child and thus
become a presumed father, entitled to block an adoption. In that case, a mother attempted to place for
adoption her child born out of wedlock without informing the natural father or allowing him to
assume responsibility for the child. The Court focused not on the question of what opportunity the
father must be given to develop a relationship with his child, but on whether a finding of detriment
was required under CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West 1983) before a child could be placed with an
adoptive rather than a natural parent. After the lower court, on remand, made the necessary finding
of detriment, see In re Baby Girl M., 191 Cal. App. 3d 786, 236 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1987), the United
State Supreme Court granted review on the question of whether the equal protection rights of an
unwed father who manifested significant parental interest in his child are violated when his rights are
terminated upon a finding of detriment. McNamara v. San Diego County Dep't of Social Serv., 108
S. Ct. 1466 (1988); see also Michael U. v. Jamie B., 39 Cal. 3d 787, 218 Cal. Rptr. 39, 705 P.2d 362
(1985) (holding no substantial evidence to support trial court's decision that placement with natural
father would not be detrimental to child).
116. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4(3)(b) (1987) permits termination of the parental rights of the
father of an illegitimate child if the father fails to file a notice of paternity prior to the filing of a
petition for adoption. Cases interpreting this statute have varied on the level of opportunity a father
must be given to comply. Compare Ellis v. Social Servs. Dep't of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980) (due process requires father who was out of state at
time child was born to be given opportunity to show that he was not afforded reasonable opportunity
to comply with statute) and In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986) (due process
offended where father expected mother to bring child to live with him and father not contacted by
mother about birth of child until after child relinquished for adoption) with Wells v. Children's Aid
Soc'y, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984) (due process satisfied where mother did not know father opposed
adoption and where father had notice of birth and of mother's intent to relinquish child for adoption)
and Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984) (due process does not require that
father have notice of statute).
117. Erickson, The Feminist Dilemma Over Unwed Parents' Custody Rights. The Mother's
Rights Must Take Priority, 2 LAW & INEQUALITY 447, 456 (1984) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
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[instead] decided to allow her body to be used to bear the child, she should
have priority for custody." 118
Both of these arguments fail to address the conflicting rights of the fa-
ther. The Supreme Court has recognized the male, as well as the female,
right to procreate. 1 9 Supreme Court precedent establishing the constitu-
tional rights of parents to their children also has covered men as well as
women.
1 20
In defending the mother's rights to give up her child for adoption, Pro-
fessor Nancy Erickson argues that the father's constitutional rights depend
upon the existence of a family that, in the case of unwed biological par-
ents who are not living together, does not and will never exist. 21 This
argument misreads the significance the Supreme Court has attached to the
relationship between a child and his or her unmarried father. Although
the cases Erickson cites, Quilloin v. Walcott12 2 and Stanley v. Illinois,23
distinguish situations where an ongoing family relationship existed (Stan-
ley-father's rights protected) from those where one did not (Quil-
loin-father's rights not protected), neither case endorses or permits the
destruction of one parent-child relationship (inchoate or otherwise) on be-
half of another parent-child relationship that does not yet exist (i.e., the
adoptive family). Likewise, neither permits one parent to terminate the
interests of the other in order that the first may turn his or her rights over
to a third party. Again, further justification is required.
One possible justification, offered by Erickson, is that since the woman
has endured the risks, inconvenience, and pain of pregnancy and child-
birth, she deserves to have all of the rights associated with the child.12
This claim is one of ownership, explicitly focusing on what is fair to a
person who has performed certain feats or experienced certain depriva-
tions. The argument implicitly undermines affirmative parental attitudes
of giving, responsibility, and commitment, by rendering them objects of
exchange. In the following section, I restructure the issues to redeem those
values.
C. Relationship, Responsibility, and Adoption of Newborns
In analyzing how we might attempt to implement the norm of responsi-
bility in parent-child relationships, we confront two overlapping tensions.
First, the goal of promoting the ideology of parental responsibility as a
general matter may conflict with the goal of making evaluations based
118. Id. at 451.
119. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (protecting man's right not to be involunta-
rily sterilized).
120. See supra note 77.
121. Erickson, supra note 117, at 457.
122. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
123. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
124. Erickson, supra note 117, at 466.
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upon that ideology in individual cases. Second, the goal of protecting and
enhancing the norm of responsibility within the mother-child relationship
may interfere with the goal of protecting and enhancing responsibility
within the father-child relationship.
The tension in the law between expressing desirable values in our gen-
eral rules and reaching the "correct" results in individual cases is a recur-
ring dilemma. Simple rules with few or no exceptions, such as those that
give automatic authority to fathers to block adoptions, may send the most
unequivocal messages-such as that fathers are responsible for children.
The stronger the rules that both parents have responsibility, the more re-
inforced will be the norm that both parents should assume responsibility
(reinforcement we may badly need. 5). Yet where the result of applying
such a rule in a particular situation is to allow an irresponsible father to
thwart the responsible plans of a mother to provide for the care of their
child, the rule seems to bring the wrong result and, in rewarding irre-
sponsibility, send the wrong message.
The tension between promoting responsibility by fathers and promoting
responsibility by mothers further complicates the matter. A rule that rec-
ognizes the biological connection between father and child by giving un-
wed fathers veto power over adoptions will promote, in a general way, the
ideology that biological fathers should, and will, love and care for their
children and be responsible parents. As a result, we might expect fathers
actually to care more for their children and to provide them with material
and emotional support.
Quite the opposite rule, however-one that recognizes the mother-child
relationship by giving the mother authority to place the child for adop-
tion-will support maternal responsibility. While this goal already has
considerable support in our social and legal ideologies, there may be spe-
cial reasons to emphasize its importance. Mothers have a kind of
automatic responsibility for their children. 26 Under current law the
mother may decide whether to abort the fetus. 27 And she must decide
how to conduct herself and care for herself and the child during preg-
nancy. " 8 These decisions, including whether she smokes, drinks, or keeps
125. Bartlett & Stack, supra note 5, at 33-34.
126. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1068-69 (Okla. 1985) (from time of
birth, mother more likely than father to be faced with decisions about how to best care for child); In
re T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1025 (1980) (mother automati-
cally responsible for child in way that father is not); In re Baby Girl S., 628 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1982), vacated sub nom. Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., 460 U.S. 1074
(1983) (same).
127. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
128. In some states, the pregnant woman may be subject to criminal penalties for failing to care
adequately for her fetus. For a discussion of a woman's legal duties during her pregnancy, compare
Steams, Maternal Duties During Pregnancy: Toward a Conceptual Framework, 21 NEw ENG. L.
REv. 595 (1985-86) with Meyers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23
DuQ. L. REV. 1 (1984) (condemning imposition of prenatal duties prior to fetus' viability); Note,
Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of "Fetal Abuse," 101
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a healthy diet, are extremely important to the child.12 After childbirth,
too, it is almost inconceivable to us that the mother will have no part in
deciding what will happen to the child. Rules that give unmarried
mothers the authority to make decisions about their children, including
whether to place them for adoption, "[encourage] the unwed mother to
properly care for the child by assuring her that her wishes as to the dispo-
sition of the child will not, absent her consent or a finding of the child's
best interest, be subject to the absolute veto of the biological father."13
We instinctively want to transform this responsibility point into a rights
or entitlement argument. Because the pregnant woman cannot avoid tak-
ing responsibility for the child, the argument would go, it is only fair to
allow her to place her child for adoption. 31 This form of argument, how-
ever, reflects the exchange view of parenthood, which in turn elevates pa-
rental rights over parental responsibility. To promote responsibility, we
must focus instead on the links between responsibility, the need for free-
dom to act, and the circumstances under which parents will exercise this
freedom.
There is an enormous range of circumstances within which conflicts
over placement of children for adoption occur. The mother may wish to
place the child for adoption because her economic circumstances and her
family support networks make her unprepared or unable to provide prop-
erly for the child; she may conclude that although she longs to keep her
child, the child would be better off with an adoptive family. 132 In these
circumstances, her decision to place her child for adoption is an act of self-
sacrifice for the welfare of her child. If she is not permitted to carry out
her plan, she may decide to keep the child herself, 3 or to abort the
HARV. L. REV. 994 (1988) (arguing that criminalization of fetal abuse violates woman's constitu-
tional privacy interests); Recent Developments, The Pamela Roe Stewart Case and Fetal Harm:
Prosecution or Prevention?, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 227 (1988) (arguing against fetal harm stat-
utes). In the most highly publicized case on this subject to date, involving a pregnant woman who
abused drugs and failed to follow her doctor's orders, a demurrer was sustained to charges brought
under a criminal non-support statute. People v. Stewart (San Diego Mun. Ct. Feb. 26, 1987) (No.
M508 197) (copy on file with author).
129. The pregnant woman's peace of mind, which may be affected by whether she will be able to
make binding decisions on behalf of the child, may also be important to the health of the child she is
carrying. Erickson, supra note 117, at 460.
130. In re T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d at 797; see also In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d at
1068-69 (because from conception through infancy unwed mother will constantly be faced with deci-
sions about how to care for child not faced by unwed father, mother must be given maximum flexibil-
ity to decide how best to care for child); In re Baby Girl S., 628 S.W.2d at 264.
131. See, e.g., In re Baby Girl S., 628 S.W.2d at 264; see also In re Adoption of Baby Boy D.,
742 P.2d at 1069; In re T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d at 797.
This argument would be weaker where the mother was married and her husband had automatic
legal responsibility for the child. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978); Buchanan, supra
note 94, at 336, 340; Hafen, supra note 9, at 496, 498.
132. See, e.g., Adoption of Baby Boy D., 159 Cal. App. 3d 8, 205 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1984).
133. See, e.g., id., 205 Cal. Rptr. at 369; Michael U. v. Jamie B., 39 Cal.3d 787, 793 n.5, 705
P.2d 362, 43 n.5, 218 Cal. Rptr. 39, 43 n.5 (1985); In re Anonymous, 97 Misc.2d 927, 416 N.Y.S.2d
729 (1979); see also Erickson, supra note 117, at 458-59. Professor Erickson obtained statements
from unwed mothers who explained their decisions to place their newborns for adoption, as part of
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child."" Either of these two alternatives would be a choice that she might
consider inferior to adoption, but necessary in her view to prevent what
she perceives as an even greater harm-custody of the child by an irre-
sponsible father.
Not all mothers, however, make decisions based on their consideration
of the welfare of the child. It is conceivable that a mother may want to
give up her child casually, because she concludes that having a child
would interfere with her life. She may intentionally wish to frustrate the
father's interest in having a child, without regard to how adequate a par-
ent he (or she) might be. Or she may wish, simply, to act on a strongly
held principle (or "right") that she, and not the father, is entitled to make
the choice, because she has taken all of the mental and physical risks of
pregnancy and childbirth" 5 (an attitude fostered, I have argued, by the
legitimation of rights arguments).
The range of circumstances within which fathers act may also be quite
varied.""6 Some fathers will feel a strong psychological attachment to their
children and wish to do well by them. These fathers will make sure that
they have enough economic resources and family support to be able to do
so. Others will react primarily to a possessive urge to control someone
they perceive as being "theirs," 37 or want to keep the child as an act of
power over the child's mother.
In the face of the wide range of possible factual scenarios, a simple,
automatic rule that assumes one particular set of circumstances-for ex-
ample, that mothers always act to best promote the welfare of their chil-
dren"'58-may reinforce certain desirable aspects of responsibility in some
cases, but lead to very unsatisfactory results in others where the circum-
stances do not match the rule. This dilemma suggests the need for broad
rules with specific, individualized application. Such rules should create a
responsibility-based standard that both assumes, and attempts to measure,
responsible decision-making in individual, highly fact-dependent cases in
which parents make competing claims to a newborn. The relevant factors
may include a parent's reason for relinquishing a child for adoption (or
her work for an amicus brief to the United States Supreme Court in support of the constitutionality of
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.01(3), 12.02(c), 13.21 (Vernon 1986), under which an unwed father
may be able to legitimate his child and thus to block an adoption only if the mother agrees or the
court finds legitimation to be in the child's best interests.
134. Erickson, supra note 117, at 455, 460.
135. Id. at 466.
136. See In re K., 535 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 907 (1976) (need to
distinguish father who is devoted to child, from rapist, sperm donor, or man who has engaged in "hit
and run sexual adventure").
137. See, e.g., Adoption of Baby Boy D., 159 Cal. App. 3d at 16, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 364 (quoting
unwed father attempting to block adoption: "Well, I don't really care anyway. I just want to prove my
point, and I would probably give the baby back to the [adoptive parents] anyway.").
138. Cf. Hafen, supra note 9, at 496-501 (urging, in unwed father cases, that law assume un-
married father will not have long-term commitment to his child that married father will have).
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opposing the adoption), the plan for the child, the nature of the relation-
ship already established with the child, and so on.
Such an approach could well incorporate shorthand devices, such as
presumptions or burdens of proof, that interpret society's current under-
standing of what constitutes responsibility, and that avoid some of the un-
certainty and cost of individualized hearings. Thus, for example, the law
might begin with a presumption that the mother's actual relationship to
the child established during pregnancy and childbirth makes her decision
to place the child for adoption a responsible one, a presumption which the
father may overcome with evidence that his plan to keep the child is more
responsible. Convincing and realistic plans for providing adequately for
the child would be relevant evidence, as would evidence about his attitude
toward the mother's pregnancy. 3
Rules requiring the father to take affirmative steps to give notice of or
judicially establish his paternity in order to have any rights in the adop-
tion proceeding 40 might also be justified. These rules, however, should be
based upon society's understanding of relationship and responsibility,
rather than on what seems fair to the parents. Results should depend ulti-
mately upon societal judgments about existing and potential opportunities
for responsible parent-child relationships, rather than upon what is due
parents. Thus, for example, rules should permit distinctions between fa-
thers who demonstrate responsibility and those who simply wish to frus-
trate the mother's wishes to place the child for adoption or to have what is
"theirs."
An individualized, fact-specific approach may grant considerable discre-
tion to judges. It has become routine to criticize judicial discretion on the
grounds that it makes decisions too subjective and unpredictable.14 How-
ever, certainty or predictability of results can be overrated. Simple, easily
administrable rules, while generally desirable, almost necessarily have the
effect in custody cases of disregarding, even denying, the significance of
the quality of parental behavior or attention to the parent-child relation-
ship in individual cases.14 2 An approach that avoids questions about re-
139. See, e.g., Adoption of Baby Boy D., 159 Cal. App. 3d 8, 205 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1984) (father
initially refused financial responsibility of pregnancy, and at one time suggested mother have abor-
tion); In re Adoption of Doe, 524 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. App. 1988) (father urged mother to have abor-
tion, was erratic in his support of her during pregnancy, and kept changing his mind about child's
adoption); In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1987) (father showed no interest in
mother's pregnancy); In re K., 535 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 907 (1976)
(same); see also cases cited supra note 105.
140. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Mnookin, supra note 13; see also Elster, supra note 16, at 24 (simple, automatic
rules lead to fewer and shorter custody disputes); Hafen, supra note 9, at 484, 500, 515-16, 559 (rule
of law threatened if individualized, subjective determinations required).
142. Cf Mnookin, supra note 13, at 290 (decisionmaking by coin-flip "symbolically abdicates
government responsibility for the child and symbolically denies the importance of human differences
and distinctiveness."); Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 9, at 1860 (treating people as individu-
als allows law to make more complex and therefore fuller moral judgments about them and their
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sponsible conduct declares that the nuanced values we may wish to ad-
vance are not important enough to warrant the bother of difficult fact-
finding.
Individualized hearings, by contrast, allow parents to argue about the
content and meaning of their own relationships with the child and what
they think matters in these relationships. In articulating their hoped-for
roles with respect to the child, parents will be participating in the creation
of their own meanings and further public meanings of responsibility in
parenthood. As more of these discussions take place, our understanding of
what should matter will evolve and, hopefully, improve. While this pro-
cess may lack the simplicity and administrability we prefer, it appropri-
ately reflects the complex values and tensions that questions about
parenthood entail.
V. SURROGATE MOTHERS CHOOSING TO KEEP THEIR CHILDREN
Infertile couples 143 sometimes resort to surrogate mother 4  arrange-
ments in order to produce a child biologically related to one of them. Con-
ception is accomplished, ordinarily, through the artificial insemination of
a "surrogate" who accepts money in return for her agreement to surren-
der the child to the father and to have her parental rights immediately
terminated. If a surrogate mother changes her mind and wants to keep
her child, she may seek to exclude the biological father entirely from the
child's life. In this event, her claim to keep the child will violate not only
the terms of her contract, but also custody rules designed to insure that a
child have two parents.1 45 The custody battle between biological parents
that follows sets at odds some of our most basic values-the sanctity of
situations).
143. Most commentators assume that the contracting couple will be infertile, but there may be
other reasons why couples seek surrogacy, such as the desire to avoid transmitting genetic defects or
the inconvenience and risk of pregnancy. See infra note 187. These other factors complicate considera-
bly the policy analysis of surrogacy contracts.
144. Despite its misleading connotations, I use the term "surrogate mother" to mean legal surro-
gate mother, in accordance with what has become the ordinary usage of the term. A "surrogate
mother" is, of course, the child's biological mother, plain and simple. The term "surrogate" is used
because a biological mother who agrees to carry her child for another who ultimately will have legal
rights in the child, is acting in the place of that other.
145. If the mother is married, as is customary, see O'Brien, Commercial Conceptions: A Breeding
Ground for Surrogacy, 65 N.C.L. REv. 127, 132 n.35 (1986); Parker, Motivation of Surrogate
Mothers: Initial Findings, 140 AM. J. PSYCHiATRY 117 (1983), her husband could be designated the
second parent. One little explored legal issue in surrogacy arrangements is the conflict that may arise
between paternity statutes which, in most states, allow a biological father to rebut any presumption of
legitimacy, see Unif. Parentage Act § 4(b), 9B U.L.A. 287 (1987), and artificial insemination statutes
which render the mother's consenting husband the legal father, see Unif. Parentage Act § 5, 9B
U.L.A. 301 (1987). See Bartlett, Courts Not Bound by Parental Agreements, 119 N.J.L.J. Feb 20,
1987, at 27 n.2, col.3; Taylor, Conceiving for Cash; Is It Legal?: A Survey of the Laws Applicable to
Surrogate Motherhood. 4 N.Y.L. Scn. Hum. R'rs. ANN. 413, 431 & en 32 (1987). The issue is also
raised, but not resolved in Sherwyn & Handel v. Department of Social Servs., 173 Cal. App. 3d 58,
218 Cal. Rptr. 778 (1985) (dismissing for lack of standing attorneys' challenge to county interpreta-
tion of California law that biological father in surrogacy arrangement is not child's father).
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motherhood on the one hand, the powerful drive for reproduction and the
value of keeping one's word on the other. This section focuses on a ques-
tion that may have important consequences for our understanding of
parenthood: Whether courts should enforce these agreements through spe-
cific performance.
1 46
A. The Legal Background
In the absence of specific legislation covering surrogacy arrange-
ments,147 a variety of state statutes may be considered applicable to the
specific performance claim. Virtually every state has legislation making
the payment of money for a child a crime.1 48 Such legislation, under con-
ventional contract analysis, might render surrogacy contracts illegal and
thus unenforceable.1 49
146. This article addresses only the conflict that arises when a party seeks to breach a surrogacy
contract at the birth of the child. Numerous other legal issues that can arise under surrogacy agree-
ments are beyond the coverage of this piece. For a more comprehensive description of some of these
issues, see Note, Developing a Concept of the Modern "Family": A Proposed Uniform Surrogate
Parenthood Act, 73 GEo. L.J. 1283 (1985) [hereinafter, Note, Developing a Concept]; Note, Surro-
gate Motherhood: Contractual Issues and Remedies under Legislative Proposals, 23 WASHBURN
L.J. 601 (1984); Comment, Artificial Insemination and Surrogate Motherhood-A Nursery Full of
Unresolved Questions, 17 WILLAMrrrE L. REv. 913 (1981).
147. Despite the extensive legislative activity which the surrogate parenting issue has produced,
see Surrogate Parenthood: A Legislative Update, 13 Farn. L. Rep. (BNA) 1442 (July 14, 1987)
(describing 64 different bills introduced on subject from January to June, 1987), only a few states
have enacted laws affecting the legality or enforceability of surrogate parent contracts. Florida and
Michigan have prohibited contracts involving the payment of money in connection with a surrogacy
arrangement. See Act effective July 1, 1988, ch. 88-143, 1988 Fla. Laws 477 (West); MIcH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 722.581-.722, 863 (1988). State legislatures in Indiana and Louisiana have declared surro-
gate parenting contracts to be void and unenforceable. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-8-2-2 (Bums Supp.
1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:2713 (Supp. 1983). Only Arkansas and Nevada appear to allow
judicial enforcement of surrogacy contracts. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201(c)(1) (1987) (in case of
surrogate mother giving birth, child shall be that of "woman intended to be mother"); NEv. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 127.287(5) (1988) (anti-baby-selling statute not applicable if woman enters into "law-
ful contract to act as surrogate").
148. Pierce, Survey of State Activity Regarding Surrogate Motherhood, 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA)
3001, 3001 (Jan. 29, 1985); see also Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-selling Laws, 20
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoas. 1, 8 n.34 (1986) (listing 24 statutes prohibiting baby-brokering
activities.
149. See Franklin v. Biggs, 14 Or. App. 450, 461-62, 513 P.2d 1216, 1221 (1973) (invalidating
adoption based on agreement and $200 payment); see also Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 173-
74, 307 N.W. 2d 438, 440-41 (1981) (declaratory judgment upholding constitutionality of anti-
babyselling statute in surrogacy context). Even agreements for adoption without the payment of
money are invalid. See In Re Rhea, 207 Kan. 610, 612, 485 P.2d 1382, 1384 (1971) (pre-birth
agreement by mother allowing her sister to have custody of child not enforceable).
One line of cases has upheld some agreements between family members providing for payment to
mothers who relinquish their children for adoption, where courts have been satisfied that the agree-
ments serve the best interests of the children. See, e.g., Reimche v. First Natl Bank of Nevada, 512
F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1975) (contract between parents of illegitimate child, under which father was to
provide for mother in will in exchange for her consent to his adoption of child, held enforceable since
adoption was in best interest of child and monetary gain was not prime motivating factor on mother's
part); In re Shirk's Estate, 186 Kan. 311, 350 P.2d 1 (1960) (agreement by mother to consent to
adoption of child by child's grandmother in exchange for one-third interest in grandmother's estate,
upheld as being in best interests of child); Clark v. Clark, 122 Md. 114, 89 A. 405 (1913) (agreement
providing for payment for adoption in family situation where child's best interests were served by
agreement held enforceable). To the extent that these cases depend upon a court's finding that the
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Other state statutes impose procedures and requirements that must be
satisfied before an adoption can take place. Some require an adoption to
be arranged through a state agency or an agency that has been licensed
and approved by the state.150 Still others allow a mother some amount of
time (either a specific or "reasonable" period) to revoke her relinquish-
ment of her child for adoption,15 a waiting period not provided for in
most surrogacy contracts. A number of statutes specifically prohibit or in-
validate parental consent to adoption before the child is born. 52 These
agreement serves the child's best interests, they do not stand for the enforceability of certain kinds of
adoption contracts, but rather only for the proposition that the contract will not preclude a court from
deciding a custody case in the best interests of the child.
Two weaker arguments under conventional contract law analysis could also be made against re-
quiring specific performance of surrogacy contracts. First, to the extent that the contract is a services
contract rather than a contract for the sale of goods (see infra text accompanying notes 165-76),
specific performance would be an inappropriate remedy. See O'Brien, supra note 145, at 150-51
(discussing principle in surrogacy context); see also A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.7, 835-36
(1982) (same in general context); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(1) (1981) ("prom-
ise to render personal service will not be specifically enforced"). At the point when the pregnancy and
delivery are complete and all that remains is the obligation to change legal status, it could be argued
that specific performance is also unavailable because an agreement in the context of an intimate fam-
ily relationship, like promises to marry, cannot be specifically enforced. See Farnsworth, Legal Reme-
dies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1150-52 (1970); O'Brien, supra note 145, at
150. Susan Wolf explains how the premises of each of the arguments are inapplicable in the surro-
gacy context. Wolf, Enforcing Surrogate Mother Agreements: The Trouble with Specific Perform-
ance, 4 N.Y.L. SCsl. HUM. RTs. ANN. 375, 391-93 (1987).
150. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10-2 (1986); ARSz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-105 (Supp. 1987); CAL.
CIv. CODE § 224m (West 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-4 9a (1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 904 (Supp. 1986).
Several states make exceptions from these procedures for blood relatives and stepparents. See, e.g.,
CON. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-63(a)(3) (1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 904 (Supp. 1986); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 63.212(1)(a) (West Supp. 1987); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 28A, § 11 (West 1981);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.22(2)(c) (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-108 & -
109 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-34(A)(3) (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39 (West Supp.
1987).
151. See, e.g., MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-311(c)(1) (Supp. 1987) (parent may revoke con-
sent up to 90 days or until final decree of adoption, whichever comes first); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
259.24(6a) (West Supp. 1988) (parent's consent may be withdrawn for any reason within 10 working
days); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.160(2) (Supp. 1988) (consent revocable until court approves
adoption); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-5(b) (1986) (consent revocable within 10 days of execution if formal
requirements for parental consent or relinquishment of legal custody not met); see also New York ex
rel. Louisa v. Faella, 37 A.D.2d 598, 322 N.Y.S.2d 831 (1971) (consent to adoption effectively re-
voked by request for baby's return less than 30 days after surrender); In re Adoption of R.W.B., 485
Pa. 168, 172 n.2, 401 A.2d 347, 349 n.2 (1979) (natural parent may revoke consent at any time until
adoption ordered).
152. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.060(a) (1987); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-9-208(a) (1987); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 63.082(4) (1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-4 (Cum. Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. §
31-3-1-6(b) (Burns 1987 & Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.030(6) (Vernon 1986); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-15-07 (1981). Many states specify a time after the birth of the child before which parental
consent to relinquish the child for adoption will not be effective. See, e.g., ARtz. REV. STAT. ANN. 8-
107(B) (Supp. 1987) (72 hours); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40 1511 (1980) (72 hours); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 199-500(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp. 1986) (fifth day); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:422.7(A) (West Supp. 1988) (fifth day); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 2 (West 1988) (fourth
day); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-5 (1972) (three days); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.070(1) (Supp.
1988) (72 hours); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:7 (Supp. 1987) (72 hours); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
40-7-38(B) (1986) (72 hours); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.08(A) (Anderson 1980) (72 hours); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2711(c) (Purdon Supp. 1988) (72 hours); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-225(A)
(1987) (10 days); see also People ex rel. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 530 N.Y.S.2d 613 (A.D. 1988)
(pre-birth consent to adoption voidable). Texas allows a suit to be filed for the involuntary termina-
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statutes, too, arguably render surrogacy arrangements illegal.153
Finally, state statutes limit the grounds upon which parental rights may
be involuntarily terminated, usually to circumstances involving parental
unfitness, neglect, abandonment, or failure to support.'" Courts have rec-
ognized that the right of parents to continued custody of their children has
constitutional dimensions.1 55 Unless it is determined that these statutory
and constitutional protections can be waived before the birth of a child,"'
the specific enforcement of surrogacy contracts would violate them as well.
B. Rights Claims
1. Constitutional I Moral Rights Claims
When a biological mother reneges on her contractual agreement to give
up the child to the father and his wife under a surrogacy arrangement, the
constitutional arguments on both sides follow a familiar pattern. On be-
half of couples seeking enforcement of surrogate parent contracts, it is ar-
gued that individuals have a constitutional right to procreate. Since indi-
viduals are constitutionally protected in reproducing coitally, the
argument goes, they also have a constitutional right to reproduce non-
coitally1 57 The equal protection clause provides an alternative constitu-
tion of parental rights before a child is born, but no hearing may be held on the petition until the
child is at least five days old. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.021(a) & (b) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
Similarly, the state of Washington allows a petition for relinquishment to be filed before the child's
birth, WASH. REv. CODE § 2633.080(3) (Supp. 1988), but a hearing may not be held on the petition
sooner than 48 hours after the child's birth, 26.33.090(1). For a short while, one state, Wyoming,
specifically allowed pre-birth relinquishment of a child for adoption. See Wyo. STAT. § 1-22-109(c)
& (e) (Supp. 1986), interpreted in Matter of Adoption of B.G.D., 719 P.2d 1373, 1375-76 (Wyo.
1986). The statute has since been amended to allow relinquishment only after the birth of the child,
as in other states. Wyo. STAT. § 1-22-109(c) (1988).
153. See infra text accompanying notes 164-176.
154. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 26-18-7 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-61c to 45-61h
(West 1981 & Supp. 1988); DEL_ CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103 (1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.447
(Vernon Supp. 1988); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.02 (Vernon 1986).'
155. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (parents entitled to clear and convincing
standard of proof in termination of parental rights hearing).
156. Pre-birth waiver of the parents' constitutional rights raises the same policy issues as the
alteration by contract of the statutory protections of parents in the adoption process. See infra text
accompanying notes 164-176.
157. See, e.g., Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 Loy. L. REV. 357, 359-61 (1986);
Graham, Surrogate Gestation and the Protection of Choice, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 291 (1982);
Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, 1980 S. ILL. U.L.J. 147, 165; Robertson, Embryos,
Families and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. Rzv.
939, 958-64, 1040 (1986); Note, Developing a Concept, supra note 146, at 1295-98; Comment,
Prohibiting Payments to Surrogate Mothers: Love's Labor Lost and the Constitutional Right of Pri-
vacy, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 715, 729-30 (1987); Comment, Surrogate Mother Agreements: Con-
temporary Legal Aspects of a Biblical Notion, 16 U. RICH. L. Rav. 467, 479-82 (1982) [hereinafter
Comment, Surrogate Mother Agreements]; Note, The Rights of the Biological Father: From Adoption
and Custody to Surrogate Motherhood, 12 VT. L. REv. 87, 108-11 (1987) [hereinafter Note, The
Rights of the Biological Father]; see also In re Baby M., 217 N.J. Super. 313, 386, 525 A.2d 1128,
1164 (Ch. Div. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
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tional argument. If men are allowed to sell sperm, on similar reasoning
women must also be allowed to sell their reproductive services. "
In opposition to these claims, women make two related arguments. The
first links entitlement to the child to the woman's role as biological
mother: By the time the child is born, mothers have invested nine months
of personal risk and sacrifice, discomfort and pain, all of which outweigh
the trivial burden to fathers of donating sperm for the purpose of artificial
insemination and having their expectations frustrated. " The second ar-
gument draws the familiar analogy between abortion and custody: Be-
cause a woman has a constitutional right to abort the fetus during preg-
nancy (regardless of the stake the father may have in seeing the pregnancy
continue to term), she also has preemptive rights to the child at birth.""
All of these arguments are deeply rooted in an exchange view of
parenthood. Women's claims to parental rights based upon their invest-
ment in carrying and bearing a child, and the arguments of biological
fathers based upon surrogate mother contracts, justify entitlements accord-
ing to deeds done (pregnancy and childbirth), or commitments made (the
contract). The hardships experienced by the mother in pregnancy and
childbirth are seen not as an inevitable and defining element of
parenthood, but (by the woman) as a detriment suffered that entitles the
mother to a right or (by the man) as an item of contractual exchange.
Likewise, the obligation assumed by the father to assume care and custody
of the child is seen not as a contingent aspect of a formative personal
relationship but as the consideration entitling the father to enforce the
mother's reciprocal promise to give up the child. The claims of both
mothers and fathers, in sum, focus on actions of the adult that are asserted
to give rise to mature rights, based upon principles of fairness and equity
between those adults.
The remaining arguments on behalf of both mothers and fathers rely
158. The Baby M. court put it this way: "If a man may offer the means for procreation then a
woman must equally be allowed to do so." 217 N.J. Super. at 388, 525 A.2d at 1165. See also
Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of the Problems and Suggestions for Solutions, 50 TENN.
L. REV. 71, 81-82 (1982); Keane, supra note 157, at 153; Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduc-
tion: Virgin Territory for Legislation, 44 LA. L. Rav. 1641, 1653 (1984); Note, Developing a Con-
cept, supra note 146, at 1293-94; Comment, Baby-Sitting Consideration: Surrogate Mother's Right
to "Rent Her Womb"for a Fee, 18 GONZ. L. REv. 539 (1982-83); Comment, Parenthood by Proxy:
Legal Implications of Surrogate Birth, 67 IOWA L. REv. 385, 386 (1982); Comment, Surrogate
Motherhood. The Need for Social Acceptance, 13 OHio N.U.L. REv. 517, 524 & n.62 (1986).
159. See Annas, Redefining Parenthood and Protecting Embryos: Why We Need New Laws, 14
THE HASTINGS CENTER REP. 50, 51 (1984) (mother has contributed more of herself and thus has
greater investment in child); Eisenberg, Surrogate-Mother Contracts, 20 THE BOALT HALL TRANS.
10 (Fall/Winter 1987) (mother's bond to newborn infant stronger than those of father "who has not
participated, even in a companionate way, in the pregnancy"); Stanworth, The Deconstruction of
Motherhood, in REPRODUCTWVE TEcHNOLOGmS, supra note 46, at 10, 22 (women's claims to chil-
dren based upon commitment involved in pregnancy and birthing, and fact that mothers assume day-
to-day responsibility for care of children); Note, The Rights of the Biological Father, supra note 157,
at 108-11.
160. O'Brien, supra note 145, at 151.
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upon precedent that is entirely inconclusive as to the question it purports
to resolve. The claim to custody rights made by surrogate mothers based
upon the woman's privacy right to choose abortion overlooks the weaken-
ing of the mother's interests as her fetus develops.""' As to her rights
against the father, constitutional precedent outside the limited context of
abortion establishes the rights of parents, not just women, to their chil-
dren.162 Hence the argument proves, and ignores, too much.
So also the father's right to procreate and his right to buy the reproduc-
tive services of a woman are inadequate to justify his claim. There may
be, indeed, a "right" to non-coital reproduction. But this right, like the
other constitutional claims made in this context, has limited content,""
and little usefulness in settling custody disputes between two biological
parents.
2. Statutory Rights Claims
The debate over surrogacy also focuses on the applicability of anti-
baby-selling, adoption, and termination of parental rights statutes.'4 Ar-
guments on behalf of fathers seeking contract enforcement distinguish be-
tween the performance of services entailed in surrogacy agreements and
baby-selling, which is prohibited under adoption statutes.'1 5 This argu-
ment has had some success in the courts.' 6 It is, however, a formalistic
argument that ignores the underlying purposes of adoption regulations.
Statutes prohibiting the exchange of money for adoption are meant to
avoid the injury to personhood that would accompany the placement of
specific monetary value on individuals. 67 The objective of a surrogate
mother contract is to transfer parental rights from the mother to the bio-
logical father and his wife. Surrogate contracts generally fail to make ex-
plicit the intention that the wife of the biological father will ultimately
adopt the child, in order to promote the fiction that the transaction is
limited to dealings between biological parents both of whom already have
161. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
162. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
163. See O'Brien, supra note 145, at 140; Stark, Constitutional Analysis of the Baby M. Deci-
sion, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 23-33 (1988).
164. See supra notes 148-156 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 158, at 108-17; Katz, supra note 148, at 21, 25; Keane,
supra note 157, at 154-59; Note, Developing a Concept, supra note 146, at 1289-92; Note, Litiga-
tion, Legislation, and Limelight: Obstacles to Commercial Surrogate Mother Arrangements, 72
IOWA L. REv. 415. 422-27 (1987); Comment, Surrogate Mother Agreements, supra note 157, at
476-79; Note, Legal Recognition of Surrogate Gestation, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 107 (1982).
166. See Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky.
1986) (distinguishing surrogate parenting arrangements from buying and selling of babies); In re
Baby M., 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in part, 109
NJ. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988) (adoption statutes not applicable to surrogacy arrangements); In re
Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 132 Misc. 2d 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1986) ($10,000 fee in surrogacy
arrangement does not violate New York statute prohibiting compensation in connection with
adoption).
167. See In re Baby M., 109 N.J. at 423-25, 537 A.2d at 1241.
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rights to the child.16 But at the heart of most arrangements, as at least
one court has recognized, is the expectation that the child's biological
mother will consent, for money, to the biological father's wife taking her
place as the child's mother."'
More fundamentally, who the parties to a surrogate contract are does
not change the commercial nature of the transaction. The crictical fact is
that surrogacy arrangements, however dressed up, constitute bargain and
exchange over the incidents of parenthood. Even the father, whose biologi-
cal connection to the child is seen as the reason for differentiating adop-
tion from surrogacy° 70 pays money for the purpose of obtaining a package
of rights to a child-a package to which he would not otherwise be fully
entitled.'
The distinctions between surrogacy and adoption likewise have little
relevance to the state policies served by rules that do not allow a parent to
relinquish parental rights until the birth (or some specific length of time
after the birth) of the child. 7 2 States are concerned that parents who sur-
render their children for adoption do so only after making careful, well-
considered decisions.17 3 Some courts and commentators have argued that
surrogate mothers do not make hurried agreements under emotional and
financially-strained circumstances and are thus not vulnerable to pressure
and exploitation.17 This argument, however, makes too much of the dif-
ference in timing, and too little of the economic pressures presumably kept
under control by statutes prohibiting the payment of money for babies.17
The critical fact is that surrogacy arrangements allow women (and men)
168. See Clark, New Wine in Old Skins: Using Paternity-Suit Settlements to Facilitate Surrogate
Motherhood, 25 J. FAM. LAW 483, 505-07 (1986-87).
169. The New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the difficulties with the goods/services distinc-
tion in rejecting the analysis of the trial court in In re Baby M. that adoption laws did not apply to
surrogacy arrangements. See In re Baby M., 109 N.J. at 423-25, 537 A.2d at 1240-41; see also
Kentucky ex rel. Armstrong v. Surrogate Parenting Assocs. 11 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1359 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1985) (Kentucky's prohibition of baby-selling applies to surrogate parent contracts), ret'd, 704
S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986); Miroff v. Surrogate Mother, 13 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1260 (1987) (uphold-
ing adoption by father and stepmother, but ruling surrogate contract violative of public policy prohib-
iting baby-selling and thus unenforceable).
170. Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986); In re Baby M., 217 N.J. Super.
313, 372-74, 525 A.2d 1128, 1157-58 (Ch. 1987), affd in part, rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537
A.2d 1227 (1988); id., 109 N.J. at 434 n.8, 537 A.2d at 1246 n.8.
171. See Capron, Alternative Birth Technologies: Legal Challenges, 20 U.C.D. L. REv. 679, 703
(1987) (drawing comparison to one joint tenant paying other to give up rights in property).
172. See supra notes 151-52.
173. See, e.g., Sees v. Baber, 74 N.J. 201, 377 A.2d 628 (1977).
174. See Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 211, 212; Note, Developing a Concept,
supra note 146, at 1288; Comment, Revocation of Parental Consent to Adoption: Legal Doctrine
and Social Policy, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 564, 570, 571 (1961); Comment, Surrogate Mother Agree-
ments, supra note 157, at 478-79; Note, Moppets on the Market: The Problem of Unregulated Adop-
tions, 59 YALE L.J. 715, 724-29 (1950). This argument was endorsed by the trial court in In re Baby
M., 217 N.J. Super. 313, 372, 525 A.2d 1128, 1157, but was rejected on appeal by the New Jersey
Supreme Court, 109 N.J. 396, 437-38, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (1988).
175. See supra notes 148-49.
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to view the ability of a woman to bear a child as the source not only of
procreation, but of commercial profit as well.1"'
C. Relationships and Responsibility Within Surrogacy Arrangements
The debate over surrogacy raises important issues about the source of
responsibility within the parent-child relationship. To what extent does
responsibility flow from physical or psychological connections, as custody
law assumes, and to what extent may it be established from within the
private, contractual setting, to which contract law ordinarily applies?
Within custody law, there is a strong ideology that through pregnancy
and childbirth an enduring bond develops between mother and child
which cannot easily be broken. This mystical bond is perceived of as inev-
itable and more powerful than any woman can realize in advance."' State
statutes that regulate adoption, particularly those statutes limiting pre-
birth adoption agreements, reflect this ideology. Insofar as the ideology
designates women as the natural rearers of children, it has been used to
limit women's options outside the home, especially in the workplace, and
thus has not been entirely favorable to women.178 But as a model for how
we might want parents to feel about their children, it seems a constructive
starting point-certainly a better one than the model of sperm donation to
which society, through its artificial insemination statutes, gives an entirely
functional, non-relational meaning.
Subsuming custody questions into contract law principles in surrogacy
contexts reconstructs the ideology of motherhood by dissociating gestation
and relationship. Whether this reconstruction is a desirable one is a ques-
tion not easily answered. The effects of the reconstruction vary for each
mother-child-father triad, and desirable effects often have undesirable
counterparts. For example, surrogacy reinforces the bond of the biological
father and child, enhancing the ideal that fathers are responsible for their
children. At the same time, however, it presupposes that the biological
mother-child bond is easily severed, that pregnancy and childbirth is a
process which does not necessarily entail enduring human emotion and
permanent connectedness, that women can have children and give them up
176. See Surrogate Parenting Assocs., 704 S.W.2d at 216 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting); see
also infra note 179.
177. For one statement of this ideology, see Lacey, supra note 63, at 317 ("It is impossible for a
woman to predict in advance how she will feel during pregnancy. As she carries a child and begins to
feel it move inside her, her emotional attachment to the child may grow beyond her original
expectations.").
178. See C. SMART, supra note 46, at 177-80, 208-13; Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy
and the Equal TreatmentIspecial Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325,
352-53 (1984-85). For a review of feminist views on the oppressive dimensions of women's role as
reproducers, see Rose & Hanmer, Women's Liberation, Reproduction, and the Technological Fix, in
SEXUAL DIVISIONS AND SOCIETY: PROCESS AND CHANGE 199-200 (D. Barker & S. Allen eds.
1976).
1988]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 98: 293
if the price is right,' and that women who make such agreements and
change their minds are acting improperly, even pathologically.18
Surrogacy's effect on the ideology of adoption is also mixed and contra-
dictory. On the one hand, by recognizing the adoptive mother's connection
to the child, surrogacy reinforces non-biological parenthood, rendering
adoption a co-equal rather than a second-class alternative to biological
parenthood. 8 At the same time, enforcing surrogacy contracts approves
the conflicting notion that having a child "of one's own" is very impor-
tant, especially for a man."'
Finally, surrogacy arrangements may help to dilute the stereotype of
the woman in the nuclear family whose role is confined to that of mother
and homemaker: "The bond between mother and child is demystified,
made clear, intelligible, scientific-and also provisional, revocable and of
no more than contractual force."18.. At the same time that surrogacy frees
women from some oppressive stereotypes, however, it seems slyly to re-
create them. Surrogacy strengthens the notion that infertility and child-
lessness is "bad."'" It also depends upon a continued underclass of
women-the surrogates-who will continue to be bound to their role as
babymakers 83
179. Margaret Radin, in what is perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of the commodilica-
tion issue raised by surrogacy, concludes that surrogate arrangements, or at least the exchange of
money pursuant to surrogate arrangements, should be banned. Radin, Market Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1928-36 (1987). Many of her concerns, like mine, are ideological. Surrogacy,
she argues, "expresses an inferior conception of human flourishing," commodifying the reproductive
capacity of women and children, and potentially, because of the rhetoric necessary to justify surrogacy,
"leav[ing] us all inferior human beings." Id. at 1930. This reasoning was adopted recently by a
Michigan trial court, which found surrogate parenthood contracts unenforceable on the grounds that
surrogacy "denigrates human dignity." Yates v. Keane, 14 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1160 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
1987); see also O'Brien, supra note 145, at 140, 142-47. Radin explores in some detail the suggestion
that the use of "services" rhetoric might avoid the injury to notions of personhood that marketing
babies would otherwise cause. Radin, supra at 1931. The idea is that if we speak of surrogacy as the
sale of services rather than the sale of babies, there will be less negative spillover (or, in her terms, a
reduced "domino effect") from allowing the practice. Radin rejects this analysis as "implausible,"
given society's unwillingness to justify ordinary adoption-for-money in this way. Id. at 1926, 1930.
180. See In re Baby M., 217 N.J. Super. at 392-94, 525 A.2d at 1167-68. The literature
designed to counsel surrogate mothers and their doctors about how to suppress maternal instincts
already has become quite extensive (and, to my mind, frightening). The leading "consumer's guide" to
surrogary, for example, gives this advice: "The surrogate must begin to erect an emotional barrier
. . . so that she experiences the child not as hers but as the child of the couple." L. ANDREWS, NEW
CONCErIoNs 221 (1984); see also Katz, supra note 165, at 21. It is reported generally that in order
to be chosen as a surrogate mother, the woman must demonstrate both "a strong wish for children,"
and the ability "to abandon this wish." Zipper & Sevenhuijsen, supra note 46, at 131-31.
181. Radin, supra note 179, at 1931; N. Taub, Concepts of Motherhood and Reproductive
Choice: Feminist Tensions 9 (1988) (unpublished manuscript).
182. Radin, supra note 179, at 1929-30. This notion feeds the further understanding that the
important genetic line is the male line, and that women are fungible in helping to perpetuate it. Id. at
1930.
183. Scruton, Ignore the Body, Lose Your Soul, The Times (London), Feb. 5, 1985, at 10, col. 5.
184. Morgan, Making Motherhood Male: Surrogacy and the Moral Economy of Women, 12 J.L.
& Soc. 219, 232 (1985).
185. Professor Radin spells out the particular ways in which surrogacy reinforces oppressive gen-
der roles creating the "ironic" self-deception for poor women whose economic options are enhanced by
surrogacy. Radin, supra note 179, at 1930-31.
Re-Expressing Parenthood
Given the mixed ideological effects of surrogacy, and keeping in mind
that responsibility requires both strong affirmation and sufficient latitude
for parents freely to choose to act responsibly, it would seem unwise either
to criminalize surrogacy contracts or to allow specific enforcement of
them."' 6 Declining the use of courts to enforce private surrogacy arrange-
ments, even while allowing parties to make them, would retain, without
coercing, the assumption (or ideology) of current law-that, ordinarily,
parents will not give up their children. It would affirm that wanting to
keep one's children, even where one has previously agreed otherwise, is
not pathological or wrong, but rather understandable and defensible. It
would also reject the meaning of pregnancy as a calculated choice between
bearing a child with whom the mother will have a relationship (without
pay) or bearing a child for another (for pay). Such a meaning focuses on
the needs and interests of individual adults, bargaining for their own ad-
vantage, rather than on the general norm that one's pregnancy is the be-
ginning of an ongoing, responsible parent-child relationship.
Declining to enforce surrogacy arrangements would also disaffirm the
notion of "convenient" childbearing. Some couples may seek surrogacy ar-
rangements not because they are infertile but because they find pregnancy
and childbirth undesirable. The reasons may range from wishing not to
risk passing on genetic defects to desiring to avoid the health risks, pain,
physical distortion, or annoyance of pregnancy.1 8 7 As a wider range of
reasons becomes acceptable, the danger to be avoided is that parenthood
will come to be understood as a recreational activity from which adults
can experience pleasure dissociated from inconvenience.
Declining to enforce surrogacy contracts, finally, rejects the notion of
reciprocity of obligation-that because the father has bound himself to a
contract, the mother also should be bound. 88 A non-exchange, responsi-
186. A comparable position was taken by the Supreme Court of Kentucky. In Surrogate Parent-
ing Assocs. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986), the court purported to
validate surrogate parenting procedures, but found them subject to Kentucky statutes giving parents
five days following the birth of the child to revoke a relinquishment for adoption. Id. at 212-13.
While this statutory construction means that contracts will not be found illegal despite their attempt to
limit prematurely the rights of parties, as a practical matter they cannot become enforceable until the
statutory waiting period has expired. See also Garrison, Surrogate Parenting: What Should Legisla-
tures Do?, 22 FAM. L.Q. 149 (1988) (arguing that existing law, which she interprets as making
surrogacy contracts neither criminal nor enforceable, is adequate).
187. In Baby M., for example, the father's wife who intended to adopt the child apparently had
exaggerated fears of the effect of pregnancy on her multiple sclerosis. In re Baby M., 217 N.J. Super.
at 379-80, 525 A.2d at 1161-62. The reasons for a surrogacy arrangement may be quite relevant to
society's tolerance of it. Sixty-three percent of those polled by Newsweek approved of surrogacy ar-
rangements where a wife was unable to bear a child (33% disapproved), 54% approved where preg-
nancy was a significant risk to the wife's health (39% disapproved), and 14% approved where the wife
was afraid to bear a child (81% disapproved). Kantrowitz, McKillop, Joseph, Gordon & Turque,
Who Keeps 'Baby M'?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 1987, at 48.
188. This argument is problematic even on its own terms. One wonders whether a man would, or
should, be compelled specifically to perform under a contract to sell his sperm if he changes his mind
after the agreement is made. I decline here to discuss such questions because my objection is to the use
of the reciprocity principle, however it may be applied, in child custody disputes.
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bility-based construction of parenthood lives comfortably with rules that
may compel responsibility from a parent even though that parent would
not be able to compel recognition of his or her own rights under all cir-
cumstances.1 89 Likewise, it downplays concerns of fairness to either parent
which might otherwise interfere with the resolution of custody disputes
based on the primacy of relationship over individual interest.
As we have seen, custody law applicable to disputes between unmarried
parents tends to favor a child's mother.18 0 When both parents feel strong
instincts toward their children, it is unfortunate that a continuing, mean-
ingful relationship between the child and both parents is impractical.
When it is, a hard choice must be made, and should be made not on the
basis of fairness to either parent, but according to rules that affirm re-
sponsible parent-child relationships, giving priority to those that have al-
ready been formed. In many cases, the biological father will be required to
accept the disappointment of his expectations of parenthood, in the face of
the existence of a parent-child relationship that, through the vagaries of
biology, will give an initial advantage to the mother. 91 In some cases, the
father may be able to demonstrate a stronger commitment or relationship
to the child.192 But it is this demonstration of responsibility and commit-
ment to the quality of the relationship, not fairness and equality for the
parents, that should make the difference.
Adults can be disappointed in many ways when they set out to have
children, often for reasons totally beyond their control. Parents who at-
tempt surrogacy arrangements are likely to have already suffered a series
189. These rules could compel a surrogate mother to accept responsibility for a child she does not
want, such as when the father dies or becomes unable to care for the child, as well as a father, who
might change his mind about following through with a surrogacy arrangement. In both cases, the
involvement of the parent in the surrogacy arrangement creates obligations which, though unintended,
the parent is best situated to assume. The biological father in a surrogacy arrangement initiates an
arrangement for his own benefit, leading to the birth of a child for whom someone must be responsi-
ble. The surrogate mother also presumably chose to participate in the arrangement, and if it unravels,
our need to assign responsibility to a parent may make it appropriate to consider her, as well as the
father, a likely prospect. In any event, it should be noted that in these circumstances, the unwilling
parent would not necessarily be coerced into taking custody of the child, any more than the state now
coerces biological parents into assuming custody of their children. The obligations of the unwilling
parents in a surrogacy arrangement and the stigma of not accepting the children, however, would be
no less than what is imposed on other parents.
A rare example of judicial approval of the imposition of an apparently uneven, arguably "unfair,"
set of rights and burdens upon parents in the service of the relationship needs of the child is provided
in Michael U. v. Jamie B., 39 Cal.3d 787, 792, 705 P.2d 362, 365, 218 Cal. Rptr. 39, 42 (1985)
(while both natural father and presumed father have same burdens of support for child and liability
for expenses of mother's pregnancy and confinement, natural father may not have initial custodial or
veto rights equal to those of presumed father).
190. See supra note 53. The New Jersey Supreme Court in Baby M. stated that where father and
mother are separated and disagree about custody, the child should be taken from its mother pendente
life "only in the most unusual case." In re Baby M., 109 N.J. at 462, 537 A.2d at 1261.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 126-130.
192. Where the father has been given custody of the child before the mother changes her mind,
his ability to demonstrate this commitment and relationship will be greatly enhanced. See Clark,
supra note 168, at 492.
Re-Expressing Parenthood
of disappointments in attempting to conceive, and perhaps also to
adopt."'3 But their disappointment, their good works, their noble efforts to
overcome the disadvantages they may face in achieving parenthood, and
even the agreements they may be able to make before the child's concep-
tion, cannot, without more, justify their claims. Relationships are the
heart of our social and individual beings. They should be viewed not as
earned, or subject to barter or exchange, but as opportunities given to us
to express who we are.
VI. CONCLUSION
A. The "Endless (Ex)change"' '
Changing the way society approaches questions about an adult's status
as parent is a long-term project, very long-term. In this article I have
identified the extent to which our current legal thinking, shaped by an
exchange view of parenthood, causes us to focus on an individual parent's
achievement, biological contribution, and "rights," and thereby to conceive
of parenthood in individualistic, possessory terms. I have argued that
meanings of responsibility provide more appropriate norms for the parent-
child relationship, and I have suggested how a society attempting to pro-
mote such meanings might approach particular conflicts that arise when
adults make conflicting claims of parenthood.
These suggestions come without a detailed set of legislative'or judicial
proposals. This is in part because I do not wish any such proposals, which
would necessarily be contestable, to detract from the case I wish to make
for shifting from a regime of individual rights to one of relationship and
responsibility. The more fundamental reason, however, is that specific
guidelines at this moment might be misleading, implying a finality or
surety that is neither possible nor even desirable. To the extent that I have
suggested how certain issues might be resolved, these suggestions were
simply to illustrate that rules can be designed within a debate that focuses
on issues of responsibility and relationship. My principal point is that the
debate should center around these issues, rather than build further on the
individual rights doctrine to which we have become so accustomed. I have
also shown that the outcome of this debate is not necessarily conservative
193. See L. ANDREWS, supra note 180, at 1-4, 8-11; O'Brien, supra note 145, at 129; Robertson,
supra note 157, at 1028-29.
194. The term "endless (ex)change" comes from Barbara Herrnstein Smith, who uses it to de-
scribe the operation of value in human life in a way that avoids the traditional, dualistic "double
discourse of value" which maintains a sharp distinction and opposition between our economistic, util-
ity-maximizing side, and our humanistic, spiritual side. See B. SmIH, CONTINGENCIES OF VALUE:
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES FOR CRITICAL THEORY 125-34, 144-49 (1988). The term seems apt
here, not only as a manipulation of the exchange view of parenthood which I wish to change, but as
an explanation of the permanent and interactive process of publicly defining and implementing norms
such as parental responsibility that engage so many conflicting human urges, tendencies and values.
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in a political sense;195 moral discourse is not the exclusive province of the
political right and need not lead, inevitably, to the standardization of fam-
ily structures. Finally, I have suggested that the questions implicated by
the parenthood conflicts discussed in this article are fundamental enough
to engage us in a long and continuing-indeed endless-conversation, or
(ex)change, about defining ourselves as a society. To suggest an endpoint,
or anything more than a possible direction for this conversation would be
to deny its character and its significance. 9
There is another problem with specificity. As any new approach be-
comes reduced to specific rules, those rules become proxies for the original
principles sought to be served. Thus, shifts away from rights tend, per-
haps inevitably, to collapse back into rights." ' For example, if at the birth
of the child the mother's experience through pregnancy and childbirth is
said to constitute the relationship with the child to which we should attach
the most significance for purposes of promoting responsibility, it will be
said (and the mother will claim) that the mother of a newborn has a
"right" to the child. Indeed, it is the function of rules to encapsulate the
objectives they intend to implement." 8 The collapsing tendency is una-
voidable, particularly within a legal system (alternatives to which have not
yet been imagined) which sets claimants against each other as legal adver-
saries and forces those individuals to make claims against each other in
terms that establish their entitlement to the "rights" they seek.
But although our system tilts us toward thinking in terms of rights, we
should resist. We constantly should be calling up and reevaluating the
ultimate objectives we wish our law to serve, rejecting doctrine that forces
us to think of and present ourselves in terms that deny who we, at our
best moments, want to be. We should, moreover, concentrate more energy
on how to improve the meanings the law conveys through its rhetorical
activity. 9' At stake are not merely the results of particular cases, but also
our definitions of ourselves.
195. Several commentators seem to conclude that the influence of moral discourse on law and
politics is conservative. See, e.g., Hafen, supra note 9, at 550 (arguing for a policy presumption in
favor of traditional values); Schneider, Moral Discourse, supra note 9, at 1871-75 (describing "new
conservatism" as force that may reinject moral discourse into law).
Suzanna Sherry, like myself, has attempted to reclaim values and virtues rhetoric from the con-
servative right. See Sherry, supra note 6, at 985-89.
196. See M. WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 49 (1987) (more argument has
no end, only temporary stopping points); cf. C. MACKINNON, supra note 72, at 45, 77 (one cannot
state program for future before we know what women are like when they are not oppressed);
Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL
EDUc. 505, 515 (1986) (critical project "cannot set forth a permanent program, the realization of
which would be the end of politics").
197. Roberto Unger's concept of "destabilization rights" is designed in part as a means of tran-
scending this process in which law reform crystallizes into static rights. Unger, The Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 561, 600, 611-15 (1983). While this concept is not very practi-
cal, Unger's analysis is helpful in explaining how rights become static.
198. See Schauer, Rights as Rules, 6 LAw & PHIL. 115 (1987).
199. The standards of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud and Albert Solnit for state intervention in
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B. A Feminist Postscript
If to some my proposals are insufficiently specific, to others they will
seem to take an alarming direction. As a feminist, I see trouble on both
flanks. From the right is the criticism implied in the response of one of my
colleagues: "I get it. The woman always wins." From my left is the
charge that the approach I propose is not feminist-that it is not explicitly
women-centered and that, by turning us away from women's "rights," it
is inadequately attuned to enhancing the power of women.
The complaint that my analysis merely rationalizes standards designed
to favor women is a difficult one to refute. I have argued that the parent-
child relationship should receive higher status in our law than fairness
and individual entitlement based upon principles of reciprocity and ex-
change. The fact that women by virtue of their biological and current
social positioning often have an edge with respect to the parent-child rela-
tionship2"' is unfortunate from the point of view of any androgynous goals
we might have. In making my arguments, however, I do not assume the
inevitability of the current social order with its advantages for men, or of
any other particular order; I argue in favor of one, and invite others to
argue theirs. Objections based upon who wins or who loses must be made
within the debate over what it is we are trying (and can justify trying) to
achieve.
The criticism that my approach is inadequate in advancing the empow-
erment of women reflects, in large part, a disagreement over tactics and
vision. Like other feminists, I object to the genderized hierarchy that op-
presses women. But I am not indifferent to the means by which we seek to
end that oppression. Rules explicitly designed to allow women to win cus-
tody disputes on their own terms for the sake of enhancing the power of
women would perpetuate the male norms of power and advantage, while
families and for child placement in divorce, abuse and neglect cases offer a useful model of improved
legal rhetoric. See BEFORE THE BEsr INTEREsTs, supra note 41, at 187-96; BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS, supra note 12, at 97-101. These standards, applicable to custody disputes between third-
parties and biological parents, use rhetoric that clarifies and reinforces their underlying premises and
objectives, and thus serves the law's expressive purposes. Thus, for example, in defining the "least
detrimental available alternative" principle governing child placement decisions, the standards state:
"The least detrimental available alternative is that child placement and procedure for child placement
which maximizes, in accord with the child's sense of time . . . the child's opportunity for being
wanted. . . and for maintaining on a continuous, unconditional, and permanent basis a relationship
with at least one adult who is or will become the child's psychological parent . . . ." BEYOND THE
BEs-r INTERESTS, supra note 12, at 99. The relationship between the approach I propose and these
standards is discussed supra at text accompanying notes 41-46 and note 43.
200. Women will not necessarily have an edge in all conflicts over exclusive status as parents of
newborns. For example, where biological parents compete for a child who has a third-party gesta-
tional mother, see Robertson, supra note 157, at 1011-12; Comment, Love's Labor Lost: Legal and
Ethical Implications in Artificial Human Procreation, 58 U. DEr. J. URB. L. 459, 471 (1981), there
will be no reason to prefer for custody the mother who contributed her egg over the man who contrib-
uted his sperm. Then, in the absence of more meaningful indicia of responsibility, other factors, such
as the respective abilities of the adults to parent, predictability of result, or even, perhaps, the expecta-
tions of the parties, must control. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
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doing nothing to further a transformation and reordering of values associ-
ated with childrearing that is critical to any credible progressive vision of
a better world.
More revolutionary goals are needed to transform the terms upon
which we relate to one another. Legal standards that elevate relationship
and responsibility over individual rights and personal power are examples
of such goals. These, and other more humane and cooperative norms,
must inform how we address the power issue, for if we set out to acquire
power for its own sake-allowing the enhancement of power for women
to be our first and last goal-the transformation we have wrought will be
of only a very limited sort.2"'
I do not advocate the rejection of power as a norm so that the power-
less, especially women, will be more accepting of their powerlessness. I
seek, more radically, to promote new standards upon which women and
men will relate, elevating other-directed over self-serving values within
relationships. Women have so little power now because the activities and
characteristics assigned to them have been valued poorly in relation to
those assumed by men, and because the differences associated with women
have been used to devalue women as individuals. What must change is not
only the imbalance of power, but how we value the activities, norms and
differences between men and women that have been used to perpetuate
gendered hierarchy. Our ultimate goal should be not revenge, but a world
in which women and men relate to one another and to their children in
improved, more responsible and caring ways.
201. Bartlett, MacKinnon's Feminism: Power on Whose Terms?, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1559,
1567-68 (1987).
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